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ABSTRACT1 
 
The present paper argues that the poverty headcounts for the years 2000 and 
2004 of 18.5 and 15.4 million respectively, estimated by van der Berg et al 
(2005) are too low. It makes use of the income data in the Labour Force 
Surveys (LFSs) for September 2001 and September 2004, to construct 
alternative estimates. Before making the estimates, ways are sought to 
address the weaknesses in the data sets: missing incomes; implausible zero-
incomes; under-reporting of income (and expenditure), and the poor quality 
of the social grant data in the surveys. The estimates suggest that the poverty 
headcount in 2004 was probably in the region of 18 million, having fallen 
from about 19.5 million in 2001. The 2004 findings offer support to earlier 
results (Meth, 2006a) which draw a similar conclusion, approaching the 
problem from the expenditure side. 
 
Of the 18 million people below the poverty line in 2004, 14 million lived in 
workerless households (most containing working age people, but in which 
nobody had employment). These zero-income (from employment, that is) 
households survived on a mix of social grants and/or remittances. Among 
them were about 1.8 million people in households receiving no incomes at 
all in the survey reference period, subsisting, we know not how. The 
remaining four million people below the poverty line were located in 
households containing about 800 000 workers. Although the bulk of poverty 
is caused by unemployment, the problem of the working poor still looms 
fairly large. 
 
Along with their finding of a substantial drop in the headcount, van der Berg 
et al report a large fall in the poverty gap in the period 2000-2004. The 
present paper also finds that the poverty gap fell, though not by as much as 
is claimed. Data availability limits the examination to the period 2001-2004. 
Minimal changes in the period 2000-2001 in the social grant system, in job 
creation and earnings growth make it unlikely that the fall in the poverty gap 
reported by van der Berg et al could have taken place 
 
Expansion of the social grant system, the major cause of such poverty 
reduction as is to be observed from 2000 onwards, is not sufficient to bring 
about the decline in the headcount of three million, reported by van der Berg 
et al. Evidence on the only other sources of poverty reduction, (pro-poor) 
income (earnings) and employment growth, is considered. It is concluded 
that neither are sufficient to have caused much of a reduction in poverty. 
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Employment growth is particularly ineffective in this regardit appears that 
there were large increases in the numbers of workers in the highest 
expenditure category, and falls in employment at the bottom end of the 
distribution. The upshot of this analysis is the conclusion that the fall in the 
headcount during the period 2000-2004 was more likely to have been 1.5 
million rather than three million. 
 
A set of recommendations is offered for changes to the Labour Force 
Surveys and General Household Surveys to enable them to make a better job 
of measuring poverty. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Certain claims may, if asserted often enough and with sufficient confidence, 
come to be accepted as true. This is the more likely when the claims do not 
immediately call forth a credible challenge, a situation that can easily arise 
when it is difficult to verify the claims in question.2 So it is that a set of 
poverty estimates made recently by Servaas van der Berg and his colleagues 
from the University of Stellenbosch appear to have been embraced, if not in 
the halls of academe, then at least in government. Using as one of their 
major sources, the All Media and Products Surveys (AMPS), a household 
survey conducted annually by the South African Advertising Research 
Foundation (SAARF), these authors conclude that the poverty headcount in 
South Africa fell from 18.5 million in 2000 to 15.4 million in 2004. The 
depth of poverty, as measured by the poverty gap ratio, and the severity of 
poverty, as measured by the squared poverty gap index, are also reported to 
have decreased over the period (van der Berg et al, 2005, p.17, Table 2). 
 
After years of being on the defensive in the face of claims that both poverty 
and inequality have worsened, these findings are sweet music to 
government. Frequent use is now being made of them. In his Parliamentary 
Question session on March 30th this year, for example, President Mbeki was 
asked by Prince N E Zulu of the IFP: 
 
‘Whether the government is on course to halve poverty by 2015; if not, 
why not; if so, what are the relevant details?’ 
 
Citing the research done by van der Berg et al on income poverty, the 
President began thus: 
 
‘Let me start by saying yes, we are confident that we are on course to half 
(sic) poverty by 2015.’ 
 
After reciting the headcount figures above, he added that: 
 
‘The study also shows that per capita real incomes of individuals 
comprising the poorest two population quintiles rose by more than 30 
percent during 2000-2004. Our pro-poor socio-economic policies are 
meeting with success.’ 
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The reason for his optimistic assessment is clear: van der Berg and his 
colleagues have the poverty gap ratio falling from 0.413 to 0.332 in the 
space of just four years (2005:17). Extrapolating a performance like that into 
the future could see a halving of the poverty rate before the due date. To do 
so, however, is to ignore their explicit warning that the origin of poor 
people’s rising income, social grants, will not continue to reduce poverty at 
the same rate in the future. Once full take-up of planned extensions to the 
social grant system is achieved (all eligible under-15 year old children 
receive the child support grant), the observed ‘trend’ in poverty reduction 
will come to an end. 
 
Later in the year, Joel Netshitenzhe, head of the policy unit in the 
Presidency, made use of both the van der Berg et al results, and a paper by 
Bhorat et al (2006) on asset poverty, to argue that the suggestion in John 
Pilger’s recently published book Freedom Next Time, that South Africa’s 
anti-poverty policy is not all that it should be, is not based on facts. The 
article, run in the Sunday Independent, August 20 2006, appears under the 
banner ‘Voters do not share Pilger’s perception’. Underneath this is a strip 
that reads ‘Journalist has distorted facts to suit his ideology and fails to 
acknowledge the immense changes that have taken place since 1994’. The 
newspaper would have done its readers (and itself) a service if it had 
distanced itself from what is merely Netshitenzhe’s opinion, instead of 
possibly misleading them with lurid headlines. After all, some of what 
Netshitenzhe says in the article is also dubious.3 
 
He repeats the van der Berg et al findings as though they were facts, rather 
than the tentative results of an innovative piece of research (artefacts).4 In a 
similar vein, he mines Bhorat et al piece for the most spectacular sounding 
achievements in the asset provision field. He fails to mention their finding 
that asset poverty reduction appears to have been more rapid between 1993 
and 1999 than it was between 1999 and 2004. Nor does he mention their 
conclusion that the relative headcount reduction in the bottom decile was 
much lower than that higher up the distribution (2006:33). Netshitenzhe also 
does not draw reader’s attention to the continuing ‘marginalisation of poor 
African women living in rural areas’ where Bhorat et al discover the asset 
poverty headcount rates in 2004 to have been above those in 1993 (2006:31). 
Like the van der Berg et al work, that by Bhorat and his co-workers is a 
daring new departure. The jury is still out on the question of the validity of 
their findings. There is obviously a great deal at stake here. If policymakers 
use ‘evidence’ whose reliability is in doubt, if they use evidence selectively, 
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or if they do not pay sufficient attention to the caveats with which 
researchers surround themselves, the consequences (for the poor) could be 
unfortunate. 
 
The object of the present paper is to offer a second challenge to the van der 
Berg et al findings, the first having been made in Meth (2006a), where I 
argued, using mainly the expenditure data in the LFS for September 2004, 
that the poverty headcount in 2004 was more likely to have been between 
18-20 million. The present paper makes use of the September 2004 Labour 
Force Survey (LFS) as primary source (once more).5 Section 2 of the present 
paper is given over to an examination of data problems. Four areas are 
considered: (i) the way in which missing income estimates have been 
treated, (ii) the plausibility of the zero-income estimates, (iii) the problem of 
under-reporting of income and expenditure, and (iv), the inadequacy of the 
data on social grants collected by the Labour Force Surveys. Section 3 
presents the results for the year 2004, and attempts as well, to estimate 
poverty reduction in the period 2001-2004. Section 4 of the paper is given 
over to the beginnings of a critique of the van der Berg et al estimate of a 
reduction of three million in the poverty headcount between 2000 and 2004. 
Section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
En route to reporting the findings, van der Berg et al undertake a critical 
review of the estimates of poverty and inequality made by researchers using 
the census and survey data produced mainly by Statistics South Africa 
(2005:6-9). Under-reporting of income and expenditure, implausible reports 
of zero incomes, and missing income estimates, the besetting weaknesses of 
official survey and census data, and the not wholly satisfactory means 
adopted to deal with these weaknesses are examined (pp.9-10). One 
understands the reluctance to use such flawed data. In the absence, however, 
of high quality data from surveys designed specifically to measure poverty, 
van der Berg et al are obliged to make do with whatever is available. That, 
inevitably, is also flawed. Like their Stats SA counterparts, income estimates 
in the AMPS surveys do not to capture all of the income reported in the 
national accounts. To compensate for this, van der Berg et al adjust incomes 
in such as way as to: 
 
‘… arrive at estimates of the income distribution that maintain the 
household survey distribution information but accord with national 
accounts current household income magnitudes. In other words, we trust 
national accounts data for aggregate household income, while we trust 
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survey data for the distribution of such income between households.’ (van 
der Berg et al, 2005, p.11)6 
 
They acknowledge the methodological criticisms made of such an approach. 
Much of this criticism refers to the weaknesses of the national accounts 
themselves. They note, for example, that national accounting data are: 
 
‘… prone to non-sampling errors in the form of incompleteness or 
inconsistency, and methods of data collection are often changed 
arbitrarily. Furthermore, there is no transparency in the calculations used 
to estimate aggregates, and racial decompositions of totals are not 
provided …’ (van der Berg et al, 2005, p.11) 
 
Although the true extent to which Stats SA household surveys under-report 
expenditure (and income) cannot be ascertained, the detailed household 
information gathered in the surveys makes it possible to narrow down the 
likely extent of this source of error. Using the survey figures, one can 
determine the numbers of workers per household (or their absence, in the 
case of workerless households) and in so doing, estimate the corrections to 
their earnings implied by blanket adjustments that raise survey means to 
national accounts means. The result of this exercise is the suggestion that the 
adjustments to earned incomes down at the bottom end of the distribution 
necessary to replicate the van der Berg et al (2005) results are implausibly 
high (Meth, 2006a, pp.57ff). In effect, anyone who accepts the van der Berg 
et al results is telling survey respondents that their reported income or 
expenditure levels understate the ‘true’ figures by several hundred per cent. 
 
What the van der Berg et al results offer is a weak set of numbers, 
benchmarked upon another, possibly slightly more reliable set. On this 
slender basis, the authors go out into the world with their results. These are 
being treated as though they were robust in places where this matters. 
Having been widely reported in the press, and on television and radio, they 
have made their way into government’s most recent attempt at reporting on 
progress in the field of social policy. The work in question bears the title A 
Nation In The Making: A Discussion Document On Macro-Social Trends. It 
was produced by the Policy Co-ordination and Advisory Services in the 
Presidency (PCAS, 2006), and has, as one of its objectives, the shifting of 
the focus on macroeconomic performance to one that gives social indicators 
greater prominence. In pursuit of this aim, a vast quantity of new research is 
cited, alongside some that is not-so-new. Not only do the van der Berg et al 
INCOME POVERTY IN 2004 9   
(2005) poverty headcount figures get a mention (PCAS, 2006, p.12), so too, 
does a far less estimable figure inspired by van der Berg’s work on benefit 
incidence. The figure in question (generated by Presidency staff rather than 
by van der Berg) purports to measure the impact on inequality of 
government’s programme of social spending. Here it is: 
 
‘The Gini coefficient, another widely used measure of inequality, was 
0,59 in 2000 when social transfers were excluded. If these were included, 
it was 0,35.’ (PCAS, 2006, p.14) 
 
Reproduced from an earlier effort by the PCAS, the Ten Year Review 
(PCAS, 2003), the figure of 0.35 is, as I have argued elsewhere, meaningless 
(Meth, 2004). A request made to the Head of the PCAS, Joel Netshitenzhe,7 
to consider adding the necessary caveats to the assertion in the Ten Year 
Review, was ignoredit stands unaltered. If true, the two claims made by 
the Presidency, would point to significant progress in tackling poverty and 
inequality. Unfortunately, (especially for the poor) neither claim stands up to 
serious scrutiny. In addition to arguing that the Gini coefficient story is 
misleading, I have, as noted above, also attempted to show that the van der 
Berg et al (2005) poverty headcount figures are suspect (Meth, 2006a). The 
poverty headcount of 18-20 million presented in the latter paper was derived 
from the expenditure estimates in the September 2004 Labour Force Survey 
(LFS). The present paper corroborates that finding using the income data 
(rather than the expenditure data) from same survey. Adding the set of 
poverty estimates for the year 2001, as is done in the present paper,8 makes it 
possible to begin mounting a challenge to the claim by van der Berg et al 
that the headcount fell by more than three million in the period 2000-2004. 
 
‘Bold’ is not too strong a word to describe the claims made in the present 
paper. That being so, it is probably worth admitting that such knowledge 
about poverty as can be extracted from surveys in South Africa, any surveys, 
is fragile. It therefore behoves us all to be a little cautious about the ways in 
which we promote our viewsit is almost certainly too early for any 
poverty researcher using existing national survey data to describe their 
findings as robust. 
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DATA PROBLEMS 
 
The aim of this section of the paper is to address the problems that arise 
when using the LFS (and GHS) data for poverty analysis. Although hazards 
such as the under-reporting of income and expenditure may be most 
threatening when the explicit purpose is to measure poverty, some of the 
other difficulties discussed below affect users more generally.9 As noted 
above, it is possible to use the Stats SA figures to address the poverty 
question from both the expenditure and the income side. In both 
applications, the surveys have to be pressed into a service for which they 
were not explicitly designed. That means that a variety of obstacles, of 
varying degrees of difficulty, have to be surmounted. Attacking the problem 
of poverty measurement from the income rather than the expenditure side 
(the former being, possibly, the more conventional approach) poses fewer 
problems. Certainly, the task of imputation is eased somewhat, when use is 
made of the income data as primary source of information. 
 
No census or household survey can collect all of the information required to 
understand fully the social phenomena in which researchers are interested. 
Even if cost were no object, compromises in questionnaire length are usually 
necessary to reduce respondent burden to some tolerable minimum. When, 
as is the case here, the surveys are dragooned into performing tasks for 
which they were not intended,10 ways to minimise the impact of their 
inevitable inadequacies must be found. Three of the four problems with 
which we are concerned here: missing income estimates; implausible zero-
income estimates and under-reporting of income and expenditure, are 
common to many surveys. The fourth, the inadequacy of the data on social 
grants collected by the Labour Force Surveys (LFSs), is peculiar to that 
survey. 
 
Dissatisfaction with the treatment of the problems of zero income estimates 
and of missing income estimates in existing poverty studies in South Africa 
was one of the motivating forces behind the van der Berg et al (2005) paper. 
These, and the difficulties of correcting for non-response, constitute some of 
the reasons why they ‘… question the recent poverty and inequality 
findings.’ (2005:9). Presumably referring to the 1996 and 2001 population 
censuses, they cite research which showed that zero-income households 
made up 12.6 per cent of the total in 1996 and 23.2 per cent in 2001, while 
missing income values for one or more household members were recorded in 
11.8 per cent of households in 1996 and in more than a quarter of 
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households in 2001 (van der Berg et al, 2005, p.9). Although neither 
problem occurs in such extreme form in either the LFSs or the GHSs, the 
extent to which they are present is such as to make it impossible to ignore 
them. Under-reporting of income and expenditure is also far from being 
negligible. Let us see, therefore, what has to be done. 
 
Missing income estimates 
Where individuals furnish category rather than point income estimates, it is 
necessary to assume point income estimates in order to produce household 
and per capita income figures. Rather obviously, the greater the proportion 
of the working population that gives point estimates, the smaller the amount 
of guesswork that has to be done, and the greater the likelihood of obtaining 
confirmation that assumptions made about means are reasonable. In the 
September 2004 LFS, among 25 562 respondents who reported that they 
were employed (Status1 = 1), 17 406 (68.1 per cent) gave point estimates of 
their incomes, while a further 6 427 (25.1 per cent) gave category 
estimates.11 
 
Among the employed, only 1 734 (6.8 per cent) did not furnish adequate 
income data. Of these, 1 011 refused to answer the income question, while 
666 replied that they were not able to answer (did not know). Income data 
for 56 respondents were ‘missing’, while three respondents gave income 
information but failed to provide a salary period. The task before us is that of 
reducing the number of missing income figures to an acceptable minimum. 
 
Fortunately, since the LFSs and GHSs collect both income and expenditure 
data, incomes can be imputed from the latter. This means that estimates for a 
large proportion of the ‘refuses’ and ‘don’t knows’ can be made. All but 285 
of the ‘refuses’, and 104 of the ‘don’t knows’, provided expenditure data. 
This means among the almost 26 thousand employed respondents, income 
data was unavailable for only 448 of them (1.8 per cent of the total). Of the 
285 ‘refuses’ for whom no expenditure is given, 247 refused to answer the 
expenditure question as well as the income question, while in 38 cases, the 
respondent did not know the answer. Among the latter group, 19 were white, 
and among the former, 176 were white. The 94 people who knew neither 
what their incomes were, nor what household expenditure was, were fairly 
evenly distributed divided by race group (29 African, 30 coloured and 31 
white), which would mean, of course, that the latter two groups were over-
represented. Nine of the ten respondents who did not know their income and 
who refused to answer the household expenditure question were white. 
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When figures are taken out for numbers of individuals in poverty, the 
respondents above turn up among those in the zero-income households. If 
we use race as a proxy for income, then it would seem highly likely, from 
the evidence presented above, that most of the ‘refuses’ are located in 
relatively well-off households (235 out of 389 ‘refuses’ and ‘don’t knows’ to 
both the income and expenditure questions were white). Expressed as a 
proportion of the total number of workers, those for whom an income could 
not be imputed with ease, amounted to 1.5 per cent, 0.9 per cent white and 
0.6 per cent black (African, Coloured and Indian).12 Excluding all of them 
from the poverty headcount appears to be the right thing to do, both because 
many of them will probably not be poor, and also because excluding those 
who may be poor will bias the results in a conservative direction (i.e., 
poverty will tend to be understated). 
 
Imputation of incomes has been carried out by awarding the assumed mean 
household expenditure, mainly the category midpoint,13 to individuals for 
whom this is possible (i.e., to those who do not fall into the double ‘refuse’ 
and/or ‘don’t know’ category). It is done in such a way that when 
adjustments are made to compensate for under-reporting, the imputed 
incomes are adjusted upwards by the same percentage as all other incomes. 
This will distort the ‘true’ picture somewhat, because incomes would be 
distributed across a category, with some of the respondents above the 
assumed mean and the others below, rather than being concentrated on a 
single point. Counterbalancing any tendency to overstate poverty to which 
this procedure could give rise, is the assumption that total reported 
household expenditure is made possible because the income imputed to the 
individual concerned is the sole income source in the household concerned. 
This ignores the possibility that the income required to permit consumption 
in the household could have originated from a number of other sources - 
other income earners, migrant remittances or social grants, for example. It is 
notionally possible to check this, but the numbers of individuals in any 
particular cell will be so small as scarcely to justify such elaborate measures. 
On balance, proceeding in the manner outlined above is likely to be 
conservative, i.e., poverty is likely to be understated. So, although the 
method of imputing incomes from expenditure figures must be treated with 
circumspection (the more so as the latter are available only in category form, 
and for the household as a whole),14 they are a great deal better than nothing, 
and possibly better than estimates that may be obtained from applying 
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sophisticated sequential multiple regression techniques to surveys which do 
not collect both income and expenditure data.15 
 
Zero-income households 
A substantial proportion of the South African population lives in workerless 
households. Most of these households contain persons of working age, none 
of whom has paid employment (unpaid workers in family businesses are also 
excluded). Although most of these households receive some income (it 
comes from a variety of sources, mainly social grants and migrant 
remittances), none of it is from earnings generated by household members. 
As a form of shorthand, such households are described as ‘zero-income’. A 
minority among them actually do not report any income at all. An attempt is 
made below to estimate their number. Reasons are also suggested as to why 
the surveys might miss the possibly minuscule incomes on which they 
survive. 
 
To start the proceedings, we steal a glance at some of the figures used in 
Section 4 of the present paper on the distribution of working age people by 
economic status by household income level in 2001 and 2004. In line with 
the definition of zero-income households offered above, the table which 
contains these numbers (Table 11) takes into account earned income only - 
migrant remittances and social grants are excluded. In 2001, there were 14.6 
million in zero-income households. By 2004, their number had risen to 15.7 
million.16  
 
The figures suggest that most of the people whom the surveys locate in 
households in the zero-income category are there for good reason. If the 
surveys are doing their work properly, most of the people in the zero-income 
category should be in workerless households, most of them dependent on 
grants and remittances for their very existence. For all except a small 
minority, this condition appears to be met. In 2004, among the eight million 
‘not economically active’ (according to the official definition) in zero 
income households, 95 per cent were in workerless households. For the two 
million people classified as officially unemployed, this increases slightly, to 
96 per cent.17 Although the absolute numbers of unemployed and not 
economically active are much smaller in the first non-zero income 
category,18 they too, are located mainly in workerless households (the 
relevant figures are 96 and 97 per cent, respectively). Similar results hold for 
the year 2001.19  
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The total of 15.7 million people in zero-(earned) income households is 
whittled down to about 2.5 million people (or about 5.3 per cent of the total 
population) in 1.1 million households,20 by the process of allocating migrant 
remittances and social grant income to the relevant households, and of 
removing from the zero-income households, those households that contain 
workers but for which no income data are available. To judge how many of 
these 2.5 million people can plausibly be claimed to be living in households 
in which income from all sources is zero, we place them under a socio-
economic microscope. At the outset, it is necessary to be aware that neither 
the LFSs nor the GHSs capture data on income from all possible sources. 
The questionnaires are structured in such a way that anybody who is not 
classed as employed21 is not asked the income (salary or pay) questions. The 
surveys could skip, for example, over those living on income from 
investment (not many of whom one would expect to find among the ranks of 
the poor).22 In addition, depending on the relative sizes of incomes earned, 
those who receive income from several sources, e.g., from employment and 
investments, have to omit information on some income, because respondents 
are requested to furnish the information for their ‘main’ job (Question 4.15 
in the September 2004 LFS and Question 2.8 in the 2004 GHS). Which 
income stream will find its way into the surveys will depend on the way in 
which respondents interpret the concept of ‘main’ job. There are various 
other omissions, such as maintenance payments made by divorced or 
separated ‘breadwinners’. 
 
Ignoring, as we must, these shortcomings of the survey data, we identify 
zero-income households by examining the data to see whether they receive 
earned incomes and/or transfer payments. If they receive neither, they end 
up in the zero-income category (these households, of course, as noted above, 
should contain no workers). Numbers of zero-income households and the 
individuals in them, by race, are shown in Table 1. 
 
Using race once more as a crude proxy for income, we hypothesise that the 
whites (and possibly the Indians as well), could be in households that have 
failed to disclose investment income (which could be pensions or annuities). 
Africans, by contrast, are likely to be in very poor households, living off 
scraps (barely existing). To test this, we revert once more to the household 
expenditure figures. 
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Table 1 Zero-income workerless households, by race - 2004 
 African Coloured Indian White Total 
No of households  906 000  46 000  22 000  164 000 1 140 000 
No of single-person 
households  471 000  11 000  8 000  66 000  555 000 
No of individuals 1 975 000  126 000  54 000  291 000 2 450 000 
Source: Own calculations using September 2004 LFS 
Note: The small numbers of individuals who gave their race (population group) as 
‘Other’ have been omitted. 
 
 
Table 2 shows per capita monthly expenditure in 2004 prices. Boundaries in 
the lower expenditure categories are multiples of R309 per month. That 
amount corresponds roughly to the lower of the two poverty lines used by 
van der Berg et al (R250 per capita in 2000 prices). By this measure, 
everyone in the first category in Table 2 falls below the line. As may be 
seen, they number about 1.8 million among the 2.5 million people in 
workerless households that report zero-income, the vast majority of them 
Africans. 
 
Table 2 Per capita expenditure in zero-income workerless households 
R/month African Coloured Indian White Total 
0-309 1 690 000  90 000  10 000  27 000 1 816 000 
309-618  148 000  26 000  11 000  20 000  204 000 
618-1854  64 000  11 000  33 000  60 000  162 000 
1854-4999  25 000  5 000  2 000  131 000  163 000 
5000-9999  1 000  0  1 000  15 000  16 000 
10 000+  60 000  5 000  2 000  37 000  103 000 
Total 1 990 000  134 000  55 000  289 000 2 471 000 
Source: Own calculations using September 2004 LFS 
Note: The small numbers of individuals who gave their race (population 
group) as ‘Other’ have been omitted. Totals do not tally because of rounding. 
 
 
The failure to capture income data other than that from work may possibly 
explain the presence of fairly large numbers of people with monthly per 
capita expenditure above the poverty line. The 37 000 whites in the R10 000 
per month plus category could well be living off investment income. It is 
possibly a little less easy to accept that there may have been 60 000 Africans 
in the same expenditure category. If this is not merely a statistical artefact 
caused by playing with very small numbers (like the 16 000 people in 
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expenditure category R5000-9999?), it would be interesting to try and 
explain. There is certainly a case to be made for the careful analysis of the 
400 000 people living on R618 per month or more, to determine the origins 
of their capacity to consume. The case is not one based on idle curiosity - a 
significant chunk of the ‘missing’ income in the surveys (the difference 
between survey income and national accounts income) could accrue to 
people at the upper end of the distribution in Table 2. 
 
Membership of a workerless household which contains nobody old enough 
to qualify for a pension, and which does not have in it enough children 
young enough to qualify for the child support grant is an almost certain 
recipe for poverty. Table 3 gives the distribution of potential social grant 
recipients among the 2.5 million people in workerless households in Table 2. 
Among the 1.8 million people in the bottom expenditure category, there 
were only 287 000 children eligible for the child support grant, and 27 000 
potential pensioners. 
 
It is plausible to suggest that the few eligible people identified in Table 3 
were unable to gain access, for one reason or another, to the social grants to 
which they would have been entitled. Although by 2004, the national 
Department of Social Development had made significant progress in its 
attempts to reach all eligible grant recipients, it is well known that take-up of 
the grants was then far from complete (Noble et al, 2005). Common reasons 
for non-receipt of social grants include such mundane but real obstacles as 
the lack of the necessary documents, or the wherewithal to make repeated 
trips to the nearest government office to complete the application process. 
 
Table 3 Potential social grant recipients in zero-income households 
Household expenditure 
(R/month) 
Men older 
than 64 years 
Women older 
than 59 years 
Children younger 
than 12 years 
R0-309  15 000  12 000  287 000 
R309-618  6 000  9 000  22 000 
R618-1854  13 000  21 000  14 000 
R1854-4999  36 000  47 000  4 000 
R5000-9999  6 000  2 000  2 000 
R10000+  8 000  11 000  11 000 
Total  80 000  99 000  336 000 
Source: Own calculations using September 2004 LFS 
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On the face of it, it does not seem unreasonable to suggest that there could 
be 1.8 million people living in households that surveys such as the LFS and 
the GHS will describe as zero-income. Answering the question of how these 
people exist is not easy - the surveys eject respondents into employed status 
at the slightest provocation - people of working age are so classified if they 
performed an hour’s work in the reference period, the past seven days before 
the interview. Work is defined to include a broad range of activities, ranging 
from ‘proper’ paid work, or the running of a business, through to unpaid 
assistance in a household business, to engaging in subsistence agricultural 
activities, or to major domestic ‘do-it-yourself’ construction projects on 
one’s own plot.23 
 
It may be that some of the zero-income households are an artefact caused by 
the use of a seven-day reference period for determining employment status 
in the Labour Force Surveys.24 Poor people’s engagement in work for which 
some remuneration, either in cash or kind, is forthcoming, may be sporadic. 
For many, this will be less the consequence of their willingness to work than 
it is of the availability of work of any sort. By limiting employment to work 
done in the previous seven days, the surveys may be creating a problem (that 
of a relatively large number of people with the apparent ability to survive on 
thin air), where one does not exist in reality (this need not mean that the 
people concerned are not very poor). Evidence that this may be so is 
suggested by the survey’s inquiries into subsistence agricultural activities. 
Here, instead of the reference period being a mere seven days, it is a full 
calendar year (people are asked to name the months in which they performed 
agricultural work). Among the males of working age in zero-income 
workerless households, about 170 000 did some work of this nature. About 
145 000 working age females did so as well. A change in the design of the 
questionnaire could elicit quite a different story about the survival strategies 
of the very poor. 
 
Certain it is, that despite the frustrations that those in zero-income 
workerless households must experience on a regular basis, labour force 
attachment remains strong. Roughly one million or so people among the 1.8 
million in the bottom expenditure group in Table 2 were potentially 
economically active. Of them, 470 000 were officially unemployed, while 
and 744 000 were unemployed according to the expanded definition. Of 
those who were not economically active, almost all (about 300 000) were at 
school. The picture before us is surely one of a relatively large group of 
people with a strong desire to work but whose access to work of any sort 
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may be so intermittent as to cause them to be classified as living in zero-
income households, when the truth is that while still existing from hand-to-
mouth, they do so on the basis of occasional work supplemented by 
whatever they can beg, borrow or, in some cases, steal (literally). 
 
Administrative vs. household survey data on social grants 
Most, though not all, of the poverty alleviation that took place in the period 
2000-2004 occurred as a result of the consolidation and extension of a social 
grant system, which by developing country standards, was already quite 
large in the year 2000 (Seekings, 2002). Since it is the intention to estimate 
poverty levels from household survey data, it is necessary to compare the 
numbers of grants thrown up by the surveys with those yielded by the 
administrative records. 
 
Table 4 shows changes in the numbers of beneficiaries from social grants of 
different types. The big changes are in the disability grants, which double in 
number over the period, and, of course, in child support grants, which see a 
more than twelve-fold increase. Foster care grants also increase in number, 
but are dwarfed by the absolute increase in the number of old age pensions, 
modest though it is in relative terms. 
 
Table 4 Numbers of beneficiaries of various social grants 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Old age 1 860 710 1 877 538 1 903 042 2 009 419 2 060 421 
War veterans  7 554  6 175  5 266  4 594  3 961 
Disability  612 614  627 481  694 262  953 965 1 270 964 
Grant-in-aid  8 748  9 489  10 332  12 787  18 170 
Foster care  79 937  85 910  95 216  138 763  200 340 
Care dependency  24 438  28 897  34 978  58 140  77 934 
Child support  352 617  974 724 1 907 774 2 630 826 4 309 772 
Total 2 946 618 3 610 214 4 650 870 5 808 494 7 941 562 
Source: National Treasury, 2004, p.74. 
 
 
As noted in the introduction, the September 2001 and 2004 LFSs constitute 
the primary data source for the poverty estimates in the present paper. It is 
their performance as gatherers of information that needs to be assessed. First 
choice as an instrument for measuring poverty should be the GHSs. Properly 
designed and administered, they could provide valuable information on 
poverty. They are, however, deficient in several respects. One of the most 
important of these is the failure to collect data on migrant remittances.25 
Since the latter are an important source of income, especially in households 
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that are otherwise workerless (i.e., they contain working age people, none of 
whom is employed), it is necessary to use the LFS rather than the GHS when 
attempting to estimate poverty levels. 
 
Collecting information on social grants is (or rather was) not one of the 
strong points of the LFSs.26 The GHS is potentially capable of identifying 
the individual recipient of each social grant, whereas the LFSs are only able 
to report that the household received a social grant of one sort or another. 
The LFSs do not say how many such grants are received. This is because of 
the way the questions are asked in the respective surveys. The performance 
of the two surveys in capturing information on the major grants is shown in 
Table 5.27 The results presented are those for the 2004 GHS, and the LFSs 
conducted in September 2001 and 2004. The GHS results are there because 
of their apparently superior performance in collecting information on social 
grants. Although the wording of the question about the receipt of social 
grants (Question 1.50) is slightly ambiguous, the 2004 GHS asks it in such a 
manner as to make it possible to identify individual recipients within 
households.28  
 
Ideally, the results for the earlier year should be those for the year 2000 (one 
of the two earlier years for which van der Berg et al estimate poverty levels). 
The September 2000 LFS, however, contains no household expenditure 
estimates, making imputation of incomes in the manner done below, 
impossible. It is necessary, therefore, to use the 2001 figures instead. 
Unfortunately, there are no GHS figures available to use as adjusters and 
comparators for the 2001 LFS social grant results. The first GHS was 
conducted in 2002. Rather than asking the question on social grants as is 
done in the 2004 GHS, the 2002 GHS is like the LFSs, in that it asks only if 
any member of the household received any of the ‘following Welfare grants’ 
(Question 4.43). If the fact that the first GHS results are a year later than the 
2001 LFS figures did not knock them out of the competition, then the fact 
that using them would necessitate making the kinds of awkward assumptions 
that we have to make in order to make use of the LFS figures on social 
grants, certainly would. No attempt is made, therefore, to present any 
counterpoint figures for the year 2001. 
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Table 5 Nos. of social grant beneficiaries in the 2004 GHS and 2001 and 2004 LFSs 
 Monthly household income from employment 
2004 GHS Zero R0-309 R309-927 R927-2163 R2163-4999 R5000+ Total 
Child Support Grants 2 166 000  85 000  342 000  664 000  644 000  480 000 4 382 000 
Old Age Pensions 1 684 000  33 000  109 000  201 000  213 000  281 000 2 516 000 
Disability grants  682 000  11 000  51 000  94 000  134 000  123 000 1 087 000 
Foster Care Grants  57 000  2 000  2 000  6 000  13 000  16 000  93 000 
        
2004 LFS Zero R0-309 R309-927 R927-2163 R2163-4999 R5000+ Total 
No of households reporting receipt of a social grant 
Child Support Grants 1 263 000 64 000 230 000 462 000 526 000 332 000 2 875 000 
Old Age Pensions 1 425 000  25 000  93 000  197 000  189 000  250 000 2 175 000 
Disability grants  523 000  10 000  47 000  84 000  113 000  123 000  894 000 
Foster Care Grants  14 000  0  3 000  6 000  4 000  12 000  35 000 
Estimated number of child support grants 
Child Support Grants 2 483 000  118 000  448 000  873 000  949 000  620 000 5 488 000 
        
2001 LFS Zero R0-264 R264-792 R792-1848 R1848-4999 R5000+ Total 
No of households reporting receipt of a social grant 
Child Support Grants 264 000 18 000 66 000 103 000 102 000 60 000 612 000 
Old Age Pensions 1 250 000 34 000 98 000 190 000 213 000 242 000 2 021 000 
Disability grants 231 000 7 000 31 000 55 000 68 000 64 000 453 000 
Foster Care Grants 13 000 1 000 2 000 3 000 4 000 7 000 26 000 
Estimated number of child support grants 
Child Support Grants 426 000 26 000 113 000 163 000 166 000 82 000 972 000 
Source: Own calculations using September 2001 and 2004 LFS and 2004 GHS data. 
Note: The under-reporting error for income is assumed to be 100 per cent. Income is from employment only. 
 
 
As may be seen in the table, the GHS estimates of the numbers of children in 
respect of whom a child support grant was made conform closely to the 
administrative estimates set out in Table 4.29 If the GHS figures are reliable, 
then the presence of so many grant recipients (about 500 000) in the last 
income category in the table (the R5000-9999 and R10 000 plus categories 
consolidates), may be telling us an interesting story about people collecting 
grants to which they are not entitled. Old age pensions are well over the 
administrative figures (by about 450 000); disability grants are down by 
almost 300 000, while foster care grants are out by roughly 40 000. It is not 
obvious why pension recipients in the GHS results in Table 5 should 
outnumber those in the administrative data (Table 4) by so many. Question 
1.50 in the 2004 GHS asks ‘Does …. receive any of the following Welfare 
grants?’, then lists ‘Old age pension’, ‘Disability grant’, and so on. There 
should be no confusion of this with private pensions. One suspects that there 
should not be so many households in the monthly expenditure categories 
above R2163 (in 2004) and R1848 (in 2001) reporting receipt of the state 
pension. This could account for about two-thirds of the excess. An error of 
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this sort would have a fairly hefty impact on the distribution of income. If 
we were attempting to measure inequality, its effect would have to be 
examined. Since we are not, it can safely be ignored. 
 
The second and third panels of Table 5 are split into two. The first part of 
each gives the number of households reporting receipt of one or more social 
grants. The second part gives an estimate of the number of children in 
respect of whom a child support grant is made, using a technique described 
below. Of the four grants, old age pensions; foster care grants; child support 
grants, and disability grants, it is the latter that causes the most trouble. Let 
us deal with them in the order listed here. 
 
None of the surveys performs very well in terms of capturing the foster care 
grants (the LFSs being much weaker than the GHS). This is probably 
because the number of grants the surveys are looking for is relatively small 
(the needle-in-a-haystack problem).30 Since these grants are so few in 
number (relative, say to pensions or disability grants), they are merely 
reported as they pop out of the surveys. In the discussion below on the 
capacity of the various grants to lift households and individuals out of 
poverty, the effect of ignoring the difference between the survey and 
administrative data will be seen to be trivial. 
 
The LFSs appear not to perform too badly at capturing pensions. Both the 
2001 and the 2004 LFSs have more households reporting receipt of at least 
one pension than the numbers recorded in the administrative data. For both 
years, the distributions look plausible. We would expect to find large 
numbers of pensions in zero-income households; none, or very few in the 
income category R0-309; a generous splattering in the classes immediately 
above this, and with relatively few in the income category R5000 per month 
plus. This is more or less what we find when we look at the Table 5 results. 
The large numbers of pensions detected by the GHS in income categories 
R2163-4999 and R5000 plus per month (644 000 and 480 000) dwindle to 
the more plausible figures of 189 000 and 250 000 respectively. The Table 5 
pension total exceeds its Table 4 counterpart by about 100 000. Whether or 
not this may be ignored depends on the actual distribution of pensions. If the 
Table 5 distribution is roughly correct, and the extra 100 000 are located in 
the income category R5000 plus, their presence will have no effect on the 
poverty headcount. If they are located lower down, including them in the 
calculus will have the effect of overstating poverty reduction. On these 
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grounds, it has been decided not to make any compensating adjustment. 
Poverty may be (slightly) understated as a result. 
 
Combining one of the eligibility criteria for receipt of a child support grant 
with a report of a household having received at least one grant, makes it 
possible to guesstimate the numbers of grants made. The procedure gives 
one grant to a household if it reported receipt of the grant and contained a 
child younger than 12 years of age in 2004 (or seven years of age in 2001); 
two grants if the household contained two such children, and so on, up to 
four children. Doing so generated 5.5 million child support grants, as 
opposed to the 4.7 million reported by the administrative records in 
September 2004. The same approach on the September 2001 figures, 
apparently worked quite well. The 2004 survey over-estimate will obviously 
cause the number of households whose poverty levels are reduced to be 
overstated. A few ways of dealing with this problem, all unsatisfactory in 
varying degrees, exist. The method chosen scales the value of benefits paid 
in respect of each child by the ratio of the number of grants detected 
respectively by the LFS and the administrative records. Although this may 
distort the distributional impact of the grant, it at least distributes the total 
amount of money correctly. If the GHS distributions are approximately 
correct, then the technique, as a rough and ready method of allocating grants, 
probably does not perform too badly. This is because the proportional 
distributions of grants in the Sept 2004 LFS and the 2004 GHS are roughly 
the same. So much for the child support grants. 
 
As far as numbers of grants made are concerned, the disability grant 
coverage in the GHS is not very good (1.08 million in the latter vs. 1.36 
million in the administrative statistics). The LFS figure (a little short of 
900 000 households reporting receipt of at least one grant) is even less 
satisfactory. Part of the shortfall in the LFS estimates of the number of 
disability grants can be recovered (but very crudely) by multiplying the LFS 
number by the number of grants per household, estimated from the GHS. 
Such a step would take us to 1.02 million. Apart from the distortions to 
which doing this will give rise, the adjusted figure is still quite a long way 
from the administrative number (1.36 million). 
 
Problems with the raw numbers of disability grants themselves are by no 
means the end of the story - in Meth (2006a), I argued that it was 
inappropriate to assume that disability grants were capable of raising 
households out of poverty simply because the size of the grant is relatively 
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large (R740 per month in 2004 prices). While it is highly likely that the 
benefit dilution associated with the grant alleviates poverty in some 
households,31 none of the studies that have looked at disability (EPRI, 2001; 
EPRI, 2004; Dube, 2005; Nattrass, 2006)32 provides a clue as to the extent to 
which the grant is capable of meeting the special needs of many of the 
disabled. That being so, it is impossible to estimate the impact of the grant 
on the poverty headcount ratio. 
 
Given the substantial increase in the numbers claiming disability grants in 
recent times, government has attempted to sponsor research into the perverse 
incentive effects of the grant. Their efforts in this regard have not been 
crowned with great success. In a context of mass structural unemployment, 
one in which there is effectively no social protection for those in the age 
bracket of 15-60 (the women) or 15-65 (the men), the grant will obviously 
act as a magnet. Horror stories of HIV-positive people manipulating their 
CD4 counts, and tuberculosis sufferers stopping treatment in mid-course, in 
order to qualify for the benefit abound. A pre-occupation with this problem 
seems to have eclipsed the equally interesting, if not attention-grabbing topic 
of the adequacy of the grant in meeting the highly varied needs of those 
classified as disabled. 
 
There are two pieces of work that point the way to the kind of work that has 
to be done. One that appeared recently unfortunately used a tiny sample, and 
is restricted to just one area. The findings, even though they are not 
representative, are of great interest. The study, which ‘… sought to assess 
the unmet rehabilitation, education and welfare needs of disabled children 
living in a peri-urban township’ reported that: 
 
‘Few disabled children attended pre-school (35 percent) or school (44 
percent). Only a quarter (26 percent) of children in need of rehabilitation 
received such services. Children with motor impairments were more 
likely to receive rehabilitation than those with intellectual impairment (44 
percent vs. 8 percent, P < 0.0001). Of the 233 assistive devices required, 
only 64 (28 percent) had been issued. Less than half (45 percent) of the 
children entitled to a social assistance grant were receiving it. Lack of 
money, limited awareness about available services, and bureaucratic 
obstacles were the main reasons offered by caregivers for the low 
utilisation of available services and resources.’ (Saloojee et al, 2006) 
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The authors claim that there are more than a million disabled children in the 
country. Glancing back at Table 4, we note that only 78 000 care 
dependency grants (grant paid to the care-givers of disabled children) were 
made in 2004. Even if their estimate is out by a factor of five, there is clearly 
a huge unmet need. The question before us (as ever) is: to what extent are 
the needs of those who actually receive the grant, met? The difficulties are 
hinted at in the passage above, but that is all. 
 
The other piece of work is Philpott’s Budgeting for children with disabilities 
in South Africa (2004). A compendious and immensely compassionate 
study, it is replete with references to the need for more and better 
information on the impact of policy on children’s welfare. In a qualitative 
section of the work, filled to overflowing with heartrending stories, her 
informants describe the difficulties of gaining access to grants and refer as 
well to the benefit dilution that occurs as grants are used to supplement 
family income (2004:104). Unfortunately the work cannot answer the 
question posed here, namely, to what extent does the disability grant (or, in 
the case of disabled children, the Care Dependency Grant) meet the special 
needs of the disabled. Incidentally, Philpott cites a report which refers to the 
half a million disabled children in South Africa (2004:6) 
 
Another chink in the wall obscuring the reality of making ends meet on a 
disability grant is provided by Simchowitz’ report that in the Western Cape, 
in the absence of agreed criteria, assessment panels were awarding grants on 
social grounds (2004:4-5). This means, that in practice, for many disabled, 
the grants were functioning as unemployment benefits. How widespread this 
was, cannot be determined. The disability grant is means-tested, but as 
Simchowitz points out, allowable income and asset levels are quite 
generous.33 According to the 2004 GHS, almost 63 per cent of beneficiaries 
were in the zero income category. If this is a reflection of the true 
distribution of claimants, then all it requires for the grant not to lift 
households out of poverty, is that some substantial proportion of the 
beneficiaries have special needs that cannot be met from the grant. 
 
For want of a better reason for proceeding in any other way, the approach 
adopted for dealing with disability grants makes two estimates of the 
poverty-reducing impact of the grant that allow (arbitrarily) for some part of 
the special needs of the disabled to be taken into account. In other words, it 
is assumed that the grant’s ability to reduce poverty is reduced because the 
greater needs of the disabled raise their effective poverty line above R309 
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per capita (in 2004 prices). The first set of estimates are described 
(somewhat misleadingly) as ‘full value’ benefits to distinguish them from 
the second set, which assumes that the reduced effectiveness of the grants is 
more extreme. 
 
The ‘Full value’ benefits in 2004 (as they are described in Table 6 below) 
are obtained by scaling the value of the grant by the ratio of the number of 
grants detected by the GHS (1.087 million) to the number of households in 
the LFS reporting receipt of a grant (0.894 million). The value of the grant 
increases by this method from R740 to R900. Pumping up the grant up by 
the ratio of the number of grants detected by the administrative records (1.36 
million) to the LFS number, would yield an uncomfortably large amount 
going into the households listed as receiving a grant. Since the distribution 
of recipients missing from the LFS is unknown, it seems inappropriate to 
attempt to guess at it. The ‘full value’ assumption therefore is not full value 
at all, but rather is an assumption that makes an arbitrary allowance for the 
special needs of the disabled. 
 
The ‘reduced effectiveness’ assumptions take the process of allowing for 
some part of the special needs of the disabled still further (arbitrarily, once 
more). This time, the benefit is scaled by a factor derived by distributing the 
equivalent of half of the value of the total sum that would have gone to the 
1.36 million recipients, to the 900 000 households identified by the LFS as 
receiving at least one disability grant. This is referred to (in Table 6 below) 
as the ‘Half value’ disability grant option (it was worth R562 per month in 
2004). Similar procedures are used for the 2001 figures. 
 
Income and expenditure under-reporting 
Rather obviously, if the income estimates in a survey are going to be used as 
basis for poverty (and inequality) measurement, and those estimates under-
report income, then the presence of under-reporting errors will distort the 
results. The extent (and distribution) of the distortions will be determined by 
the relative sizes and the distribution of the errors. Although there are 
suspicions (probably well-founded) that certain groups will have a greater 
propensity to under-report income (and expenditure) than others, it is well-
nigh impossible to discover the magnitude of the errors.34 Reflecting on this 
issue, Ravallion (2000:3251), observes that: 
 
‘It is generally thought that conventional household surveys are not very 
accurate in measuring the incomes and consumptions (sic) of the 
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relatively rich. Unsurprisingly, this is not something about which there is 
much evidence. However, we can be reasonably confident that there is 
non-compliance (people refusing to participate in the survey) and 
probably some underreporting amongst those who do participate. This is 
unlikely to be confined solely to the rich – it is probably found at all 
levels of living. On a priori grounds it does not seem plausible, however, 
that this problem would be just as great for the poor as the nonpoor. Some 
of the poor might underreport or refuse to participate, but by and large 
they would not have any reason to do so, and there may well be just as 
much overestimation of their incomes and expenditures. And the poor 
tend to consume things that are less difficult to measure than the things 
rich people consume.’ 
 
One possibility is thus that under-reporting rises monotonically with 
income.35 A different version of the story about the propensity to under-
report could also be concocted, one which has those at the two extremes of 
the distribution as being more likely to under-report income. This would 
have as a corollary, the proposition that those in the middle of the 
distribution are likely to be in steady employment in single jobs and hence, 
to be easily capable of reporting income from one source that does not vary 
greatly from month to month, quite accurately. Plotting income (or 
expenditure) against the degree of under-reporting would generate an 
inverted U-shape. There could be a variety of reasons why those at the 
extremes of the distribution may under-report. Under-reporting could be 
intentional or unintentional. The latter could result if the person providing 
information is not very well informed as regards several aspects of 
characteristics of household members. ‘Proxy’ respondents in rich and poor 
households alike may not be in a position to answer income questions 
accurately because respondents may not want other household members to 
know details of the earnings.36 As far as intentional under-reporting is 
concerned, respondents may also, despite assurances to the contrary, believe 
that information from the surveys could find its way into the hands of others, 
say for example, the tax authorities.37  
 
One way around the problem of under-reporting of income or expenditure, it 
is to raise survey incomes (or expenditure levels) until total income 
(expenditure) is equal to the corresponding national accounts totals. This, in 
essence, is the approach adopted by van der Berg et al (2005). 
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Not all researchers trust this method of compensating for under-reporting 
error. The article from which the long passage cited immediately above is 
drawn,38 addresses the question of the strong divergence between estimates 
of consumption growth made variously from data in the National Sample 
Surveys (NSS) and National Accounts (NAS) in India, with the latter 
outstripping the former (Ravallion, 2000, p.3245).39 Commenting on the 
reliability of the national accounts figures, he notes that: 
 
‘Given the way consumption is measured in the NAS, one can hardly be 
confident that it gives an accurate measure of either the level of average 
household consumption or its rate of growth.’40 (2000:3251) 
 
He comments as well that ‘[T]he assumptions made about distribution by 
advocates of NAS anchoring are also questionable.’ (2000:3251). Similar 
problems are likely to be present in other countries. 
 
Also notable among those who cast doubt upon the wisdom of using national 
accounts to measure poverty, either alone or in tandem with survey 
distributions, is Angus Deaton (2003). According to him, it is likely that 
surveys understate consumption (and income) growth, while national 
accounts overstate it. Although he notes that: 
 
‘… there can be no general presumption in favor of one or other of the 
surveys and the national accounts.’ (2003:17). 
 
he is quite emphatic about the relative merits of surveys and the national 
accounts as the basis of poverty measures: 
 
‘there is,’ he says ‘essentially no choice but to use the surveys, because 
only the surveys provide direct measures of the living standards of the 
poor.’41 (Deaton, 2003, p.37) 
 
Yet the habit of deferring to these accounts as arbiter of what constitutes 
survey under-reporting of income or expenditure (i.e., of ‘anchoring’ poverty 
estimates in the national accounts), has gained acceptance in some quarters, 
despite Deaton’s warning that: 
 
‘… there is need for much caution … mechanical use of NAS means, 
combined with survey-based estimates of distribution around the mean, 
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will certainly give the (sic) poor measures of poverty...’ (Deaton, 2003, 
p.34) 
 
Suspect though the approach may be, it is necessary to push the Stats SA 
survey income data into equality (or near equality) with the national 
accounts figures, to see how the resulting poverty levels compare with those 
reported by van der Berg et al. The difficulty lies in guessing what the 
relative sizes of the errors should be at different points in the distribution. In 
the absence of any firm guidance on how to proceed, the procedure adopted 
in the present paper applies an equal percentage ‘correction’ to all earned 
income estimates.42 An assumed error of 100 per cent in the value of an 
income estimate, means that actual income is twice as high as reported 
income, while a 200 per cent error implies that actual income was thrice 
reported income; i.e., if Yr = reported income, Ya = actual income, and error 
= e per cent, then Ya = Yr + (Yr * e/100).43 
 
If under-reporting rises monotonically with income, or if the distribution of 
under-reporting errors is U-shaped, and either form of under-reporting 
occurs on a significant scale, uniform upward adjustment of the type 
described above, would be rendered highly problematic. Although the 
mechanics of modelling the effects of varying patterns of under-reporting are 
relatively simple, the difficulties surrounding the choice of combinations of 
assumptions, are formidable.44 It could be argued that these difficulties 
notwithstanding, sensitivity tests, even if conducted using numbers chosen 
on a purely speculative basis, might yield useful insights. Although that may 
well be true, the range of possible scenarios is huge. With no mechanism to 
guide selection among alternatives, we would flounder in a sea of 
simulationsfor better or for worse, it has been decided to stick with the 
assumption of uniform error in the simulations discussed in the next section 
of the paper. 
 
 
MEASURING POVERTY IN 2004 
 
Attempting to measure poverty with the aid of the household surveys 
conducted by Statistics South Africa presents the researcher with some, but 
not all of the problems faced by the Stellenbosch team. Approaching the task 
from the expenditure side, as I did in Meth (2006a), entailed, amongst other 
things, estimating means for the bottom expenditure category (R0-400 per 
month) and for the open category (R10 000 plus) per month. Means for the 
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categories in between emerged from the assumed (linear) distribution of 
households and individuals within them. To assist in making a dent in the 
almost intractable problem of estimating the extent of expenditure under-
reporting, the presence of income estimates, independently collected in both 
the Labour Force and the General Household Surveys (LFSs and GHSs), 
was of some comfort. Accordingly, in Meth (2006a) I used the income 
estimates to impute expenditure categories in cases where the income 
estimate exceeded the upper bound of the reported household monthly 
expenditure category. 
 
Although means have had to be assumed for some of the income recipients, 
doing so has far less of the feel about it, of having to grope in the dark. This 
is because almost 70 per cent of those earning a wage or salary gave point 
estimates of their earnings. With means estimated from these figures to 
hand, it is possible to feel far more confident about the means assumed for 
those who only furnished category (income band) estimates. In addition, 
since independently gathered estimates of expenditure are available, it is 
possible, as demonstrated in the previous section of the paper, to reduce 
missing income estimates to an absolute minimum. 
 
Even so, a number of imponderables remain - three in particular deserve our 
attention here. The first concerns the roughly 420 000 individuals, some 
250 000 of them workers for whom no income estimates can be made, who 
have to be left out of significant parts of the analysis. Because their place in 
the distribution of income cannot be determined, these people are omitted 
from the estimates of the poverty gap ratio. Omitted as well, are the 600 000 
plus people in Table 2 whose monthly per capita expenditure locates them 
outside of the ranks of the poor. Both groups find their way into the 
denominator of the headcount ratio estimates. Apart from concluding that 
they are unlikely to be poor, it is difficult to locate them with greater 
precision in the distribution of income. 
 
The second area of concern is with the fact that information on migrants has 
been collected in a manner that makes it difficult to add remittances to other 
household income.45 A related additional problem that presents itself is the 
question of the extent to which survey respondents under-report the value of 
migrant remittances. The migrant labour system is still quite extensive. 
Although only a modest percentage of workerless households receive 
remittances from migrants, there are so many workerless households that 
remittances form an important part of the income of poor households. The 
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poverty estimates below therefore illustrate the effect of varying the 
assumptions about the value of remittances. 
 
The third area of concern is with the magnitude of the required adjustment to 
incomes reported in the LFS. If it is true that they do not have to be raised to 
equality with the national accounts income estimates, then how does one 
determine the level to which they should be raised? 
 
Where possible, Table 6 presents two of the (three) standard Foster-Greer 
and Thorbecke measures, the headcount ratios and poverty gap ratios for the 
year 2004. Also presented, because of their greater comprehensibility to non-
economists, are the poverty headcounts (the actual number of people below 
the poverty line), and what I call the politician’s poverty gapthe size of the 
annual income transfer (in 2004 prices) required to raise the consumption of 
all of the poor to the level of the poverty line. Although the data will permit 
it, no estimates of the squared poverty gap ratio (P2) have been madeI 
have yet to meet an economist who can explain to a layman what that 
particular indicator of the severity of poverty means. The poverty line that 
generates the Table 6 results is the R250 per capita per month (in 2000 
prices) line used by van der Berg et al (2005).46  
 
Unknowns and imponderables of the types discussed above, raise the 
number of permutations of possible results to some quite high total. The 
columns in Table 6 offer four sets of adjustments to compensate for under-
reporting of income, while the rows contain four ‘packages’ of assumptions 
about two components of unearned income (remittances and disability 
grants). The task before us is one of narrowing the possible set of outcomes 
to manageable proportions. Arguments about how to assess the poverty-
alleviating impact of disability grants have been aired at length. Some time 
has also been devoted to a discussion of the problems involved in estimating 
migrant remittances, let alone guessing at the extent to which these have 
been under-reported. In the first panel, the ‘half-value’ disability grant 
assumption is combined with the assumption that under-reporting of migrant 
remittances is zero. In the next panel migrant remittances are assumed to be 
under-reported by the same percentage as all other income. In the third 
panel, the ‘full value’ disability grant assumption is married to the 
assumption that under-reporting of migrant remittances is zero. The fourth 
and last panel unites the ‘full value’ disability grant assumption with the 
assumption that migrant remittances are under-reported by the same 
percentage as all other income.  
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The ‘full value’ assumption, as described in the section above on the 
inadequacies of the LFSs as collectors of information on social grants, is not 
quite the full value of grants reported in the administrative data. If a way 
could be found to distribute the missing grants among the population, 
another couple of hundred thousand individuals might be ‘rescued’ from 
poverty. It remains debatable, however, whether the full value of the 
disability grants can be applied to the reduction of the poverty headcount, 
although it certainly would contribute to a reduction of the poverty gap. 
Whatever the case, as may be seen in the table, poverty headcounts in the 
region where the ‘true’ estimate might lie (somewhere between the 75 – 100 
per cent under-reporting assumptions) have a range of over two million. 
Estimates, it would appear, are quite sensitive to changes in the assumption 
made about both migrant remittance under-reporting, and the efficacy of 
disability grants. 
 
Table 6 Poverty estimates, 2004 - Income from all sources 
Error level Zero 75% 100% 200% 
1. Half-value disability grant, Zero under-reporting of remittances 
Headcount ratio (P0) 0.507 0.423 0.395 0.365 
Poverty gap ratio (P1) 0.286 0.245 0.237 0.216 
Headcount 23 200 000 19 300 000 18 400 000 16 700 000 
Poverty gap Rbn 45.5 38.5 37.1 33.4 
2. Half-value disability grant, Remittance under-reporting same as income 
Headcount ratio (P0) - 0.408 0.376 0.358 
Poverty gap ratio (P1) - 0.235 0.224 0.209 
Headcount - 18 600 000 17 600 000 16 400 000 
Poverty gap Rbn - 36.7 34.9 32.2 
3. Full-value disability grant, Zero under-reporting of remittances 
Headcount ratio (P0) 0.495 0.413 0.386 0.332 
Poverty gap ratio (P1) 0.277 0.237 0.229 0.197 
Headcount 22 600 000 18 900 000 18 000 000 15 200 000 
Poverty gap Rbn 44.0 37.0 35.7 30.1 
4. Full-value disability grant, Remittance under-reporting same as income 
Headcount ratio (P0) - 0.399 0.367 0.325 
Poverty gap ratio (P1) - 0.227 0.216 0.191 
Headcount - 18 200 000 17 100 000 14 900 000 
Poverty gap Rbn - 35.3 33.4 29.0 
Note: ‘All sources’ means all income from employment, migrant remittances and 
all social grants 
Source: Own calculations using September 2004 LFS data set 
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As far as under-reporting of income from employment is concerned, the lack 
of empirical evidence on the phenomenon, obliges us to make use of a set of 
(not-quite-arbitrary) assumed errors. These are applied to earned income 
(income from employment) at four levels. Poverty estimates are then made, 
taking into account all earnings from employment and all migrant 
remittances, plus all social grants (but, in varying ‘packages’). The first 
assumption is that there are no under-reporting errors; the second that 
incomes are under-reported by 75 per cent (earned income is multiplied by 
1.75); the third that they are under-reported by 100 per cent (earned income 
is doubled), and the fourth that they are under-reported by 200 per cent 
(earned income is trebled). 
 
Survey and national accounts income estimates are apparently pushed into 
approximate equality by assuming a 100 per cent error. On the basis of 
assumption package 4 in Table 6 (full value disability grant, remittance 
under-reporting same as income under-reporting), the estimated incomes 
from employment equal R1.005 billion, as opposed to a national accounts 
estimate of R1.096 billion, roughly 60 per cent of which is remuneration. 
This adjustment, however, ignores an unreported portion of investment 
incomes of unknown magnitude.47 As noted above, the way the income 
questions on income in the LFS an GHS are asked, makes it certain that the 
income of those who live entirely on investment income and do not regard 
themselves as ‘working’ in the conventional sense, or who as recipients of 
annuities or private pensions, do not work, will not be captured by the 
surveys. In addition, the ‘main job’ qualification in the income question 
means that recipients of income from ‘work’ as conventionally understood, 
and from investment, must omit some portion of one or the other from their 
report of income earned. These omissions could be substantial. To get 
around this problem it is going to be necessary to guess at the proportion 
omitted. Half seems too much, and a quarter may be too little. If net 
operating surplus (or income from property) amounts to about 40 per cent of 
all income, let us settle (arbitrarily) on 15 per cent of total income (midway 
between half, 20 per cent of the total, and a quarter, ten per cent of the total). 
 
In terms of this assumption, a 100 per adjustment to reported survey income 
would take the survey income total well over the top of the national accounts 
income total. The 75 per cent under-reporting error assumption, without any 
adjustment for missing investment income, raises income from employment 
to 80 per cent of the national accounts figure. Adding 15 per cent onto this 
would bring us close to the national accounts total. To make the full 
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adjustment would thus require a correction a little larger than 75 per cent to 
the survey incomes. Since, as we have seen, national accounts income 
estimates are not held in high regard by some of the most eminent 
practitioners (they probably overstate income growth), the 75 per cent 
correction in Table 6 may be somewhere near the mark. That means that we 
are probably looking at a poverty headcount in the region of 18-19 million. 
Closer than that, we cannot approach. 
 
Suppose, for a moment, that the national accounts total income is the correct 
level. There are limits to the effect that adjusting earned incomes can have. 
Pushing them upwards still further to compensate for alleged under-
reporting among the 17.1 million people below the poverty line that the 
fourth package in Table 6 generates, would have a negligible effect. This is 
because among those in poverty there are a mere 775 000 employed. 
Between them, all of the folk below the poverty line receive income totalling 
R17.7 billion, a whisper less than 1.8 per cent of total income from all 
employment. Even if their earned incomes, already doubled (in the 100 per 
cent error column) were doubled once more, the additional income would 
still not fill the gap. An assumption, on the part of a researcher, that survey 
incomes need to be adjusted upwards in such a drastic manner is tantamount 
to informing respondents that they have under-reported income by several 
hundred per cent. It is surely only the remoteness of the researcher from the 
respondent that makes such arrogant behaviour possible. In short, the 
likelihood is that the headcount is somewhere in the region of 18-19 million. 
This conclusion is in line, as noted above, with the finding (approaching the 
problem from the expenditure side) that the 2004 headcount was probably in 
the region of 18-20 million (Meth, 2006a). 
 
To replicate the van der Berg et al headcount, using the LFS data, it is 
necessary to treble all reported incomes (the 200 per cent under-reporting 
error assumptions). Even this, however, does not get the poverty gap ratio 
down to their figures (P0 = 0.332 and P1 = 0.146, 2005, van der Berg et al, 
2005, Table 2, p.17). The headcount ratio for package 3 in Table 6 
(headcount = 15.2 million) falls to 0.332, but the poverty gap ratio sticks at 
0.197. This is not far from their 1993 estimate (0.200) and the 2000 figure 
(0.205). 
 
The impact of social grants: 2004 
Estimating the impact of social grants on individual poverty is not a 
straightforward matter. As noted above, for example, it cannot be taken for 
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granted that the whole of the disability grant goes towards poverty 
alleviation. Similarly, it is well known that the claim sometimes made that 
poverty among the elderly has virtually been eliminated is untrue, simply 
because pensions are used (diluted) to support so many people. The same 
argument applies to the child support grant. Fascinating though these topics 
are, we will not pursue them here, other than to remark that detailed work in 
these areas is urgently required. For the purposes of the present paper, we 
sidestep these important issues to focus on the larger question of the impact 
of the social grant system as a whole, for it is there that van der Berg et al 
locate the major cause of the reduction in the poverty headcount that they 
report. 
 
The numbers of households and individuals lifted above the poverty line by 
social grants are evidently a function of the circumstances of the households 
into which the grants flow. Among the factors that determine whether or not 
individuals in particular households see mean incomes raised above the 
poverty line, are household size and composition; the economic status of the 
individuals within the households; household mean income; the distribution 
of income within the household (individual poverty gaps); the extent of 
benefit dilution; the contents of the grant package received by the household, 
and, in the case of the disabled, the extent of special needs. 
 
Table 7 charts the impact of the social grant system on poverty in 2004, 
gliding over most of the difficulties listed above. The old age pension, as one 
would expect, is the ‘big hitter’. By virtue of its sheer size, it raises many 
more people out of poverty than do the much smaller, but more widely 
distributed child support grants.48 The assumptions deployed to arrive at the 
results for disability grants in Table 7 are those in Panel 4 of Table 6 (Full-
value disability grant, Remittance under-reporting same as income). Using 
these assumptions, the disability grants have roughly the same impact as the 
child support grants, an unsurprising conclusion, given the numbers of 
grants distributed, and their relative magnitudes. In line with our assumption 
that the under-reporting error probably lies between 75-100 per cent, Table 7 
dispenses with the results for the zero-error and 200 per cent error 
estimates.49  
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Table 7 Nos. of households & individuals lifted out of poverty by social grants, 2004 
 Households Individuals 
75% error LFS GHS LFS GHS 
Old age pension 577 000  502 000 1 328 000 1 420 000 
Disability grant 229 000  236 000 750 000  784 000 
Child support grant 161 000  119 000 881 000  647 000 
Care dependency grant 12 000  23 000 67 000  120 000 
All social grants 980 000  894 000 3 020 000 3 052 000 
 Households Individuals 
100% error LFS GHS LFS GHS 
Old age pension 586 000  497 000 1 456 000 1 416 000 
Disability grant 221 000  244 000 692 000  837 000 
Child support grant 155 000  120 000 880 000  739 000 
Care dependency grant 8 000  17 000 20 000  62 000 
All social grants 971 000  888 000 3 052 000 3 118 000 
Source: Own calculations using September 2004 LFS and 2004 GHS data. 
 
Our best guess is that all six grants on which the LFS and GHS collect 
information had the effect of raising about 900 000 households, containing 
somewhere in the region of three million people, above the poverty line of 
R309 per capita (R250 per capita in 2000 prices). Estimates of the extent of 
poverty reduction via the social grants differ, depending on which of the two 
data sets (the GHS and the LFS) is used as the information source. In 
general, the differences are minor. We know that the GHS found too many 
state pensioners, so the differences in the two sets of results can be ignored. 
Disability grant impacts are lower in both LFS scenarios (75 and 100 per 
cent under-reporting error). In line with the argument about the untenability 
of assigning the whole of that grant to poverty reduction, the LFS figures are 
claimed to be not unreasonable. Child support grants, by virtue of the 
method used to estimate their value, have a bigger impact in the LFS figures 
than in their GHS counterparts. The differences are quite large, going a long 
way to restoring the ‘shortfall’ in poverty reduction caused by the way that 
disability grants are treated. Care dependency grants (disability grants for 
children), are under-counted by both surveys. The effect of this on the 
overall numbers is, however, small, possibly in the region of 100 000 or so 
individuals. 
 
Driving the reported reduction of three million in the poverty headcount 
between 2000 and 2004 in the van der Berg et al piece is the increase in 
social grants. The abstract in their paper puts it so: 
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‘We find likely explanations for [the] strong and robust decline in poverty 
in the massive expansion of the social grant system as well as possibly in 
improved job creation in recent years.’ 
 
If the social grant system was only capable of lifting three million 
individuals above the poverty line in 2004 (half of them alone by the old age 
pension), it is difficult to see how expansion of the system raised (most of) 
an additional number of equal magnitude out of poverty between 2000 and 
2004. That would require the system to have had a trivial impact in 2000. 
Although we cannot get access to data for the year 2000 (except for that in 
the Income and Expenditure Survey for that year), we do have data on 2001. 
Let us see what it can tell us about conditions in that year. 
 
Changes in poverty 2001-2004 
The reason why the September 2000 LFS cannot be used to test the 
proposition (from the van der Berg et al piece) that the headcount fell by 
three million or so between 2000 and 2004, is that in its infancy the LFS did 
not ask for expenditure data.50 The non-response problem for the income 
questions in the September 2000 LFS cannot be addressed with any ease 
because the absence of expenditure data robs us of the simple method by 
which to impute incomes. Fortunately, the expenditure question (which used 
to be in the October Household Surveys - OHSs) was restored to the LFSs in 
September 2001. Non-responses or poor responses to the income question do 
not disappear in that and subsequent LFSs (and GHSs as well). The 
expenditure questions in them, however, elicit far fewer ‘Refuses’ or ‘Don’t 
knows’ (or other forms of missing information) than do the income 
questions. That makes it possible to impute income, even if the simple 
category-type questions only permit rough approximations, for all but a 
small percentage of the workforce.51 So, although it is not possible (or, at 
least, not very easy) to look at changes in poverty over the period 2000-
2004, it is possible to do so for the period 2001-2004. The results of the 
attempt to do this are presented in Table 8 below. 
 
Three sets of results are presented, two of them for the year 2004. One set is 
obtained from the September 2004 LFS and the other from the GHS for that 
year. Neither the GHS nor the September 2001 LFS collected data on 
migrant remittances. To make the September 2004 LFS figures comparable, 
it is necessary, therefore, to strip remittances from the income definition. It 
is also necessary to treat disability grants for the two years in the same way. 
Accordingly, the September 2004 LFS figures in Table 8 use the ‘full value’ 
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assumption for disability grants. Poverty headcounts for September 2004 
thus exceed their counterparts in Table 6 by the amount by which 
remittances reduce poverty. A little mental arithmetic suggests that 
remittances appear to lift somewhere between one and one-and-a-half 
million people over the poverty line (depending on the extent to which 
incomes and remittances are under-reported). Lest it be thought that this 
number is small, it should be borne in mind that remittances fulfil the vital 
function of sending income into workerless households, even if they are not 
large enough to lift many of these households out of poverty. 
 
Table 8 Poverty in South Africa, 2001-2004 
September 2004 LFS     
Error level Zero 75% 100% 200% 
Headcount ratio (P0) 0.510 0.427 0.399 0.370 
Poverty gap ratio (P1) 0.305 0.262 0.255 0.235 
Headcount 23 300 000 19 500 000 18 600 000 16 900 000 
Poverty gap Rbn 48.8 41.4 40.1 36.6 
2004 GHS     
Error level Zero 75% 100% 200% 
Headcount ratio (P0) 0.542 0.460 0.442 0.401 
Poverty gap ratio (P1) 0.231 0.186 0.180 0.155 
Headcount 25 100 000 21 300 000 20 400 000 18 600 000 
Poverty gap Rbn 55.0 47.5 46.3 42.0 
September 2001 LFS     
Error level Zero 75% 100% 200% 
Headcount ratio (P0) 0.549 0.459 0.439 0.389 
Poverty gap ratio (P1) 0.375 0.322 0.310 0.310 
Headcount 24 800 000 20 700 000 19 800 000 17 600 000 
Poverty gap Rbn 50.5 43.0 41.3 37.7 
     
Change: Sept 01-Sept 04 -1 500 000 -1 200 000 -1 200 000 -700 000 
Source: Own calculations using September 2004 LFS, the 2004 GHS, and the 
September 2001 data sets. Revised weights, supplied by Statistics South Africa, 
have been applied to the 2001 LFS data. 
Note: Income equals income from employment plus social grants. No data on 
remittances are collected by the GHS and the September 2001 LFS. 
 
There are three striking features in the results in Table 8. The first is that it 
looks, from the two sets of LFS results, as though the headcount fell by 
about 1.2 million over the three years, a far cry from the 3.1 million reported 
by van der Berg et al for the four-year period. The second, however, is the 
quite substantial drop in the poverty gap ratio (possibly from about 0.316 to 
about 0.258). Third are the big differences between the LFS and GHS results 
for 2004, the latter generating a far more gloomy picture. 
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Examining the findings on poverty reduction rates yielded by the two LFSs, 
if we discount the zero-error and 200 per cent error estimates, the figures 
suggest that the poverty headcount fell by about 1.2 million -let us be 
generous and say that it could have been as high as 1.5 million. This is not 
inconsistent with expectations. As we shall see in the next section of the 
paper, a substantial part of the social grant system was in place (we can see 
this anyway, simply by inspecting Table 4); employment growth was slack, 
and there were simply not enough workers in poor households for income 
growth to have made much of a dent in poverty. 
 
To reject the finding that the fall in the headcount was approximately one-
and-a-half million (instead of three million), a number of arguments could 
be advanced, the first being that it is inappropriate to use two sets of cross-
section survey results as though they were time-series data. If this objection 
is valid, however, it must apply with equal force to the van der Berg et al 
effort, which does the same thing with AMPS survey data. Another possible 
problem is that the sample for the 2001 LFS was not adequate.52 It is also 
possible that the survey design is such that unemployment, the major cause 
of poverty in South Africa, is significantly overstated, while employment is 
understated. To investigate fully each of the ways in which the results may 
have been infected, is no small undertaking. The onus is upon those who 
would dismiss these findings, to show why it is appropriate to do so. 
 
Although estimated declines in headcounts in Table 8 are relatively slight, 
the falls in the headcount ratio are fairly substantial. Population growth and 
the reduction in poverty caused by the extension of the social grants,53 are 
working in opposite directions, with the latter dominating, in part, because 
population growth rates are falling.54 This outcome prompts a consideration 
of the contribution, positive or negative, of population growth to poverty 
reduction. South Africa’s poverty reduction goal, like that of the other 
countries committed to the achievement of the Millennium Development 
Goals, is one of halving the ‘rate’, i.e., the headcount ratio (P0).55 The 
adoption of such a goal does not mean that headcount itself must fall as well 
- it is quite possible for population growth to cause headcounts to rise while 
headcount ratios fall. Whether or not one could then say that poverty had 
‘gone down’ is one of the ‘hard questions’ posed by Kanbur (2004:6-7). 
 
Poverty in the period 2001-2004 in South Africa appears, however, 
unambiguously to have ‘gone down’. The headcount ratio (P0) and the 
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headcount, as well as the poverty gap ratio (P1) and the poverty gap all fall. 
The critical question, of course, is, by how much? Presumably emboldened 
by the van der Berg et al (2005) findings on poverty reduction, senior 
politicians, as we have seen above, have taken recently to asserting with 
confidence that the poverty halving goal will be met.56 It is not known if 
these assertions are based on a model, or are merely back-of-envelope 
calculations informed by the apparent success of poverty reduction in the 
period 2000-2004. 
 
Building a model to examine future possibilities is, of course, simplicity 
itself. Assume, for argument’s sake, that the van der Berg et al poverty 
reduction estimates for the period cannot be extrapolated into the future. 
Assume instead, that the headcount falls by three million between 2004 and 
2014. With a sustained decline in the population growth rate of 0.06 
percentage points each year from a reported population growth rate of 0.92 
per cent per annum in 2004-2005 (Stats in brief 2005, p.11), the headcount 
ratio would fall from 0.410 to 0.325. If it were assumed instead that the 
population growth rate were, say, 2.5 per cent per annum, and that it fell by 
0.02 percentage points per annum, the headcount would be roughly static. If 
the population growth rate did not fall, the headcount would begin to rise 
slowly, producing the situation (and the hard question) to which Kanbur 
(2004) refers. 
 
In South Africa’s case, it is unlikely that Kanbur’s hard question will be 
posed. Even if the rate of poverty reduction slows to a trickle, HIV/AIDS 
has reduced the population growth rate sufficiently to ensure that a fall in the 
headcount ratio will be accompanied by a fall in the headcount itself. It 
would be sobering, amidst the premature celebration of the likely attainment 
of the poverty halving goal, for the contribution of this awful epidemic to 
that (possible but unlikely) achievement, to be acknowledged. 
 
Returning to the issue of the contribution of social grants to poverty 
reduction, we note that given the substantial sum that has been thrown at 
poverty, much of which seems to have stuck where it ought, it would indeed 
be surprising if the plight of the poor had not become slightly less desperate. 
One further indication that this has indeed occurred is given by the poverty 
gap ratio, which falls by somewhere between 15-18 per cent. Associated 
with this is a fall in the poverty gap as measured by the value of transfers 
that would have to be made each year to eradicate poverty. For both the 75 
and 100 per cent error levels, the fall in this burden is between one and one-
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and-a-half billion rands. As a matter of interest, the poverty gap of R35-37 
billion in 2004, given in Table 6,57 amounted to less than four per cent of the 
national accounts income total - that is what it would cost annually to 
eliminate poverty, if only some way could be found to identify those to 
whom the transfers should be made. 
 
As far as the difference between the LFS and GHS results is concerned, part 
of it is going to arise from the different ways in which social grants are 
treated. The GHS, it may be recalled from the discussion on Tables 4 and 5, 
although it overstates the collection of state old age pensions, is generally 
better at finding out how many social grants are delivered, than is the LFS. 
This should imply, if the information on income from employment is 
satisfactorily gathered, that its ability to estimate poverty reduction is 
superior to that of the LFS. Until such time as the difference between the 
results the two instruments generate can be explained, conservative practice 
suggests that we accept the lower poverty headcounts. The GHS figures are 
thus present for information only - they act as a reminder of the fact that a 
thorough investigation is required to account for the differences.58  
 
Summing up the findings of this section of the paper, it seems unlikely that 
increases in the number of social grants and their value59 could have reduced 
the poverty headcount by much more than about 1.5 million between 2000 
and 2004. If the headcount really did fall by three million over this period, as 
van der Berg et al claim, then the causes of the fall lie elsewhere. It is also 
important to note that the poverty gap ratio and the poverty gap both fell, a 
not unsurprising consequence of the relatively well-targeted expansion of the 
social grant system. They appear, however, not to have fallen by the 
magnitudes claimed by van der Berg et al (2005). 
 
Let us delve deeper now into the question of what could have caused the 
claimed poverty headcount fall of three million. 
 
 
COULD THE HEADCOUNT HAVE FALLEN BY 3 000 000? 
 
Movement of people out of poverty could have resulted from several 
different causes. In the first place, social grants could reach more recipients. 
This may occur independently of two possible labour market changes: (i) 
employment among low-income households could increase, and/or (ii) the 
incomes of the working poor could grow sufficiently to lift them above the 
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poverty line. These two sets of changes should be connected, through the 
forces of demand and supply in the labour market. These forces may be 
attenuated or amplified by institutional pressures. While it is possible that 
there was some employment growth among the poor, and that there was 
income growth, it is well-documented that a major expansion of the social 
grant system took place. Some of the work necessary for addressing this 
question has been done in this and earlier sections of the paper. In the next 
section of the paper, an attempt is made to assemble the bits and pieces into 
a more comprehensive picture. After that is done, we look at employment 
and earnings. 
 
Poverty reduction through social grants 
To assess the validity of the van der Berg et al claim that the poverty 
headcount fell by more than three million over the period 2000-2004, much 
of the fall being attributed to the expansion of the social grant system, we 
need to assess the contribution of that system to poverty reduction in the 
relevant years. The present paper has had to restrict itself, for the reasons 
given above, to the years 2001 and 2004. As noted above, however, an 
examination of changes in the numbers of social grant beneficiaries in Table 
4, suggests that with the exception of the roughly 600 000 additional child 
support grants that were distributed, the social protection system barely 
changed between 2000 and 2001.60 If 4.9 million child support grants raise 
about 900 000 individuals out of poverty, then (very crudely) an additional 
650 000 of them might have lifted 120 000 or so people above the line 
between 2000 and 2001. Even if the number were double this, it would not 
be very big. It follows, therefore, that not too much damage is done to the 
argument by using 2001 rather than 2000 as base year for the comparison. 
 
An approximation of the impact of the social grant system is presented in 
Table 9. Once again, the absence of migrant remittance data for 2001 forces 
compromise upon us. The estimates are made by subtracting the numbers 
below the poverty line when only income from employment is taken into 
account, from the numbers below the line when income consists of income 
from employment plus social grant income. The distribution of poor people 
taking remittances as well as income from employment into account may 
differ from that based on income from employment alone. Even if 
remittances do not raise many above the line, they could bring a lot of 
households and the individuals within them close to it. Judging by the 
relatively modest size of remittances, especially in poorer households, it may 
be that the magnitude of the effect is small. Further speculation will serve no 
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point - we do not have 2001 data on remittances, so we assume that their 
poverty-reducing impact in 2001 was not much different from what it was in 
2004. 
 
With that, we turn to the figures in Table 9. These are presented at two 
under-reporting error levels, the zero- and 100 per cent levels. The 200 per 
cent level we know to be wildly improbable, and the 75 per cent level we 
know to be not far from the 100 per cent figures. Choosing the two error 
levels in the table is done so that the diminishing effect of social grants on 
poverty headcounts as assumed under-reporting error rises, can be 
illustrated. 
 
Table 9 Poverty reduction by social grants, 2001-2004 
 Households Individuals 
2001 LFS Zero error 100% error Zero error 100% error 
Income from employment only 5 916 000 4 862 000 26 477 000 21 438 000 
Income from employment plus social 
grants 5 299 000 4 290 000 24 763 000 19 769 000 
Poverty reduction by social grants  617 000  572 000 1 714 000 1 669 000 
 Households Individuals 
2004 LFS Zero error 100% error Zero error 100% error 
Income from employment only 6 501 000 5 279 000 26 734 000 21 643 000 
Income from employment plus social 
grants 5 412 000 4 308 000 23 247 000 18 592 000 
Poverty reduction by social grants 1 089 000 971 000 3 487 000 3 051 000 
     
Increased impact of social grants 
2001-2004 472 000 399 000 1 773 000 1 382 000 
 Households Individuals 
2004 GHS Zero error 100% error Zero error 100% error 
Income from employment only 6 425 000 5 410 000 28 469 000 23 506 000 
Income from employment plus social 
grants 5 443 000 4 523 000 25 020 000 20 389 000 
Poverty reduction by social grants  982 000  887 000 3 449 000 3 117 000 
Source: Own calculations using September 2001 and 2004, and 2004 GHS data. 
Note: The ‘Package 4’ assumptions were used on the 2004 LFS social grant data. The 2001 
figures use ‘Package 2’ of a different assumption set. This is described below.60  
 
 
The 100 per cent error assumptions applied to the 2001 social grant package 
lifts 1.7 million people out of poverty while the 2004 package moves just 
over 3.5 million people above the line. Larger than the 2001 impact by a bit 
over 1.4 million, the final 2004 headcount is a little less than 1.2 million 
lower than the 2001, because the pre-social grant headcount rises by about 
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200 000 between 2001 and 2004. This outcome (the 1.2 million headcount 
fall), it may be recalled, is the same as that presented in Table 8 (give or take 
the few thousand that are gained in the rounding-up process). If we add on 
the possible impact of the growth in the number of child support grants 
between 2000 and 2001 (some 600 000 grants), guesstimated above at a bit 
over 100 000, we have a total impact of about 1.3 million. 
 
Once again, the GHS figures tell a slightly different story. Although the 
headcounts are much larger (as before), impact of social grants is very 
similar to that reported by the 2004 LFS. This raises the question, once 
more, of whether the headcounts registered by the LFS are more reliable 
than those suggested by the GHS. The possibility exists, of course, that 
neither is correct. What is obvious though is that the figures all deserve a 
thorough interrogation. Only then will it be possible to make authoritative 
claims about poverty reduction, one way or another. The van der Berg et al 
finding that poverty fell by more than three million between 2000 and 2004 
gains no support from the social grant figures. 
 
For a fall in the headcount of this magnitude to have occurred when the 
portion of it attributable to the social grant system was only 1.3 million, a 
further 1.7 million would have to have moved out of poverty by the 
operation of the labour market. In a time of reportedly rising unemployment, 
and slow economic growth, it is a little difficult to see how this could have 
taken place. Let us see what the official figures (which, it must be admitted, 
are far from being considered acceptable to all social analysts) have to say 
about the matter. 
 
Poverty reduction through employment increases 
Employment (and unemployment) figures in South Africa are disputed. The 
Labour Force Surveys are presently being modified (extensively), in part 
because of the frequent claims, especially by government spokespersons 
(including the President), that the employment and unemployment totals 
they generate are incorrect. There may be some merit in these claims, 
although whether or not this constitutes a case for disregarding them is moot. 
Mistrusting the LFS results is one thing - ignoring the story they tell 
altogether, as van der Berg et al do, requires at least some defence. Their 
case for the contribution of employment creation to poverty reduction rests 
on little more than sophisticated guesswork (van der Berg et al, 2005, pp.21-
22). 
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To set the scene for the discussion that follows, the (disputed) labour market 
record for the period 2000-2004 is presented in Table 10. The table also 
gives an indication (crude) of the extent of economic growth during the 
period. As may be seen, this averaged about three per cent per annum. With 
population growth still positive at about one per cent per annum (SR P0302, 
31 May 2005, p.10), per capita incomes could not, on average, have grown 
at more than two per cent per annum.62  
 
If nothing else, the employment and unemployment figures have at least a 
sense of economic plausibility - employment dips sharply as unemployment 
rises. Towards the end of the period, unemployment falls as employment 
begins to rise. Of course, all of this may mean nothing at all - the observed 
changes may not be statistically significant; the employment numbers may 
be the captive of capricious definition (they include agricultural and informal 
economy workers, both notoriously difficult to measure), or the figures 
could simply be wrong, as critics of the LFS insist. If, however, the surveys 
capture the broad state of affairs, then poverty reduction is not what one 
would predict. 
 
Table 10 Employment and unemployment in South Africa, 2000-2004 
 
Sept 
2000 
Sept 
2001 
Sept 
2002 
Sept 
2003 
Sept 
2004 
Working age population (1000s) 27 900 28 200 28 600 29 000 29 400 
No. employed (1000s) 12 300 11 200 11 300 11 500 11 700 
      
Official unemployment      
No. (1000s) 4 200 4 700 5 000 4 500 4 200 
Rate (%) 25.4 29.4 30.4 28.0 26.2 
      
Expanded unemployment      
No. (1000s) 6 400 7 700 8 200 8 300 8 100 
Rate (%) 34.3 40.6 41.9 41.8 41.0 
      
Participation rate (%)      
Official 59.0 56.3 56.9 54.8 53.8 
Expanded 67.0 67.0 68.1 67.8 67.3 
      
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Economic growth: GDP 100.0 102.9 106.8 110.0 114.9 
      
Source: Labour market data. Statistical ReleaseP0210, 26 September 2005, various tables. 
GDP is gross value added at basic prices at constant 2000 prices, from the SARB QB, June 
2006, p.S113. 
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Incidentally, the estimates of participation rates in Table 10 demolish an oft-
repeated (by government) ‘explanation’ for lack of success in the battle 
against unemployment, namely, that growth of participation rates has so 
outstripped the rate of growth of the potentially economically active 
population (and job creation rates) that increasing unemployment was 
inevitable. As may be seen, the official participation rate falls over the 
period, and the expanded participation rate is steady. 
 
So much for the bigger picture - let us dig into the details to see how the 
poor fared in the labour market. Table 11 shows the distributions of 
employment and unemployment by monthly household income extracted 
from the LFSs for September 2001 and 2004 respectively. Two sets of 
under-reporting assumptions are used, zero and 100 per cent. Income is from 
employment only (ie. no migrant remittances and no social grants are 
included). 
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Table 11 Employment and unemployment by monthly household income category (1000s) 2001-2004 
2001 - Zero error 
assumption Zero R0-264 
R264-
528 
R528-
792 
R792-
1056 
R1056-
1320 
R1320-
1584 
R1584-
1848 
R1848-
2112 
R2112-
2376 
R2376-
2640 
R2640-
4999 
R5000-
9999 R10000+ Total 
Employed 243 606 1046 834 705 771 462 474 576 306 357 1613 1792 1622 11 399 
Officially unemployed 2101 207 324 225 240 264 147 117 195 72 96 399 210 78 4672 
Expanded unemployed 3623 396 549 399 390 405 207 189 285 111 138 576 306 108 7678 
Working age population 9101 1514 2254 1718 1496 1631 881 884 1187 576 663 3057 2832 2173 29 966 
                
2004 - Zero error 
assumption Zero R0-309 
R309-
618 
R618-
927 
R927-
1236 
R1236-
1545 
R1545-
1854 
R1854-
2163 
R2163-
2472 
R2472-
2781 
R2781-
3090 
R3090-
4999 
R5000-
9999 R10000+ Total 
Employed 252 529 909 934 774 783 481 632 331 362 541 1261 1893 2157 11 830 
Officially unemployed 1987 129 217 230 183 217 123 161 82 54 158 227 280 107 4150 
Expanded unemployed 4034 305 519 485 362 406 208 296 136 114 252 406 437 177 8127 
Working age population 10 199 1233 2063 1928 1538 1576 906 1249 598 642 1117 2245 3210 2946 31 438 
                
Change in no. employed: 
2001 to 2004 9 -77 -137 100 69 12 19 158 -245 56 184 -352 101 535 431 
Cumulative population                
2001 (1000s) 14 372 16 857 20 304 22 973 25 185 27 568 28 808 30 053 31 783 32 634 33 582 37 969 41 926 44 811  
2004 (1000s)  15 731  17 738  20 932  23 787  26 080  28 399  29 690  31 488  32 325  33 227  34 769  37 933  42 436  46 386  
                
2001 - 100% error 
assumption Zero R0-264 
R264-
528 
R528-
792 
R792-
1056 
R1056-
1320 
R1320-
1584 
R1584-
1848 
R1848-
2112 
R2112-
2376 
R2376-
2640 
R2640-
4999 
R5000-
9999 R10000+ Total 
Employed 243 174 432 441 606 468 366 399 303 228 543 1924 1858 3417 11 399 
Officially unemployed 2101 63 144 153 168 123 102 147 93 63 201 558 468 288 4672 
Expanded unemployed 3623 120 276 240 309 231 168 240 150 108 297 828 678 414 7678 
Working age population 9101 450 1064 953 1301 995 723 867 630 441 1190 3722 3527 5005 29 966 
                
2004 - 100% error 
assumption Zero R0-309 
R309-
618 
R618-
927 
R927-
1236 
R1236-
1545 
R1545-
1854 
R1854-
2163 
R2163-
2472 
R2472-
2781 
R2781-
3090 
R3090-
4999 
R5000-
9999 R10000+ Total 
Employed 252 145 384 409 500 516 419 340 434 390 393 1450 2157 4050 11 830 
Officially unemployed 1987 38 92 92 126 114 117 85 98 114 104 365 437 387 4150 
Expanded unemployed 4034 98 208 230 293 258 227 186 177 211 195 642 768 610 8127 
Working age population 10 199 365 868 922 1145 1054 874 720 818 793 783 2761 3990 6156 31 438 
                
Change in no. employed: 
2001 to 2004 9 -29 -48 -32 -106 48 53 -59 131 162 -150 -474 299 633 431 
Cumulative population                
2001 (1000s) 14 372 15 127 16 849 18 326 20 283 21 824 22 958 24 254 25 175 25 810 27 549 32 895 37 952 44 791  
2004 (1000s)  15 731  16 346  17 736  19 132  20 946  22 519  23 798  24 880  26 079  27 256  28 400  32 367  37 954  46 408  
Source: Own calculations from September 2001 and September 2004 LFS data sets. 
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The heavy concentration of the unemployed in zero-income (from 
employment), more marked in 2004 than in 2001, is one of the first features 
of the results to capture attention. Table 11 suggests, assuming a 100 per 
cent under-reporting error, that in 2004, more than half of the population 
lived in households where expenditure was less than R1854 per month.63 For 
the zero error assumption, the income figure that cuts off half of the 
population is, of course, much lower. The poverty analysis tells us that in 
2004, 91 per cent of those below the poverty line were to be found in 
households where total income from all sources was less than R1854 per 
month, and 96 per cent in households below R2163 per month (assuming an 
under-reporting error of 100 per cent). 
 
As may be seen in Table 11, net employment growth in households below 
R2163 per month is negligible - it could, conceivably, even have been 
negative. Only in the zero-error results (which must be incorrect because 
they ignore at least some degree of under-reporting) is there any suggestion 
of employment growth. That growth is restricted to the income category 
R1854-2163. Its contribution to poverty alleviation would thus have been 
small. With all the caveats about the LFS results in mind, the Table 11 
results offer the tentative conclusion that employment growth cannot have 
accounted for much, if any, movement out of poverty. 
 
Under-reporting assumptions, as one would expect, have a significant impact 
on the distribution of the employed and the unemployed. This mirrors the 
movement of people out of the lowest income categories, as income from 
employment is allowed to increase. For our purposes here, it is the figures on 
employment that are of the greatest interest. Although they are a little tricky 
to interpret, it looks as though employment grew by about 430 000 over the 
three years, with the bulk of this taking place in the highest income class. 
This much, at least, is consistent with the story about the growing black 
middle class told by van der Berg et al (2005:19). 
 
Ominously, the figures on the distribution of ‘new’ jobs appear to confirm 
Bhorat’s (1999) analysis of a movement away from a demand for unskilled 
or low-skilled workers towards an increasing demand for skills. Among 
households in the nine income categories below the R2112 per month level, 
net employment growth over the period was negative (the numbers of 
employed people in these categories fell). In 2004, these households 
contained 26 million people, well over half of the total population. If the 
 48 INCOME POVERTY IN 2004 
figures in the table are to be believed, then more than 900 000 new jobs were 
created for people in the top two income categories, over 600 000 of them in 
the open class, R10 000 per month plus. 
 
One could attempt to explain the increasing numbers of workers in the upper 
income categories by positing that they migrated up from lower income 
categories because their incomes rose. Clearly, this will be true for some 
proportion of the workforce, especially those near category upper 
boundaries. It seems an unlikely explanation for the story told by the figures 
in Table 11. The range of categories at the top end is large, so the observed 
means are quite far apart.64 To expect the kind of income increases that 
would permit much movement between categories is asking a lot from the 
growth of just three years. 
 
Settling the question of who has benefited from growth in South Africa is 
clearly a task of the greatest possible importance. The evidence presented 
above suggests that it was not the poor. On this score, van der Berg and his 
colleagues seem not to agree. Having modelled the distributional impact of 
the increase in social grants, they turn their attention to the labour market. 
The account of their offering is worth reproducing in full. Here is what they 
say: 
 
‘An alternative experiment considers the poverty impact of creating an 
additional one million jobs. The hypothetical (approximately) one million 
jobs were allocated according to the likelihood of employment based on a 
probit model of current employment. In calculating the income impact of 
such an expansion in jobs, the average unskilled wage was applied to the 
group who were additionally allocated jobs in our hypothetical scenario. 
As the tables below show, the bulk of the additional jobs would be 
allocated to the bottom five deciles of households, many of whom are 
currently without any wage earners. The rise in mean incomes is also 
considerably higher among the bottom five deciles. Using a R3000 per 
capita annual household income as a poverty line, 299 096 households are 
lifted out of poverty after the simulated increase in employment. This 
amounts to a 2.6 percentage point reduction in the percentage of the 
population that is poor. This last column also shows that the proportional 
income impact of the additional jobs is by far the greatest amongst 
households who are presently the poorest. Mean income of those 
presently constituting the poorest decile would increase by almost 46 per 
cent, whereas the mean incomes of the fourth poorest deciles and above 
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only increase by less than 10 per cent, with the impact proportionately 
least at the top of the distribution.’ (van der Berg et al, 2005, p.21) 
 
No doubt the experiment has been honestly performed. The message cranked 
out is one that all development practitioners and politicians want to hear - 
that growth is pro-poor. The finding is, however, diametrically opposed to 
the story told in Table 11 above by the LFSs. If it was not obvious before, it 
should be clear now, why a way must be found to narrow the distance 
between these two accounts (one purportedly actual, the other 
hypothetical)65 of the shape of South Africa’s recent economic history. The 
matter is too important to be treated as it has been up until now. From my 
calculations, it appears that households in the bottom decile of the 
distribution contained no workers at all. To raise their mean incomes by 46 
per cent implies a miracle of job creation, one that manifestly has not 
happened. 
 
Poverty reduction through income increases 
The Labour Force Surveys are panel surveys of a sort, even though 20 per 
cent of the sample is rotated out of them with each succeeding round. If they 
were doing their job properly, they should be able to answer questions about 
income growth in a trice. Longitudinal analysis, however, with its 
requirements for matching respondents, is a demanding business, and one 
which is still in its infancy as far as the LFS is concerned. Despite the 
insights that the (pseudo) panel might offer, there is little to tempt me into 
this minefield. As far as I am aware, no-one else has yet attempted to use the 
LFSs to answer questions about earnings.66 In any case, even if matching 
were performed satisfactorily, there would still be the problem of under-
reporting of income to confront. Even if there were roughly constant bias in 
the data, which would allow trends to be estimated, without reasonable 
knowledge of absolute income levels, little could be said about the 
contribution of income (earnings) growth to poverty reduction.67  
 
In the absence of longitudinal analysis, time series analysis carried out on 
data from household and other surveys has become the stock-in-trade of 
those seeking to understand the South African labour market. For many 
years, rising incomes among African workers, in particular, were the subject 
of energetic debate, with conservative critics seeking to show that some 
large part of South Africa’s unemployment problem could be attributed to 
wage increases (primarily the fruit of trade union activity), not being 
matched by productivity increases. In 2004, however, Casale, Muller and 
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Posel (2005) leapt into the fray, arguing that average real earnings fell in 
value over the period 1995-2003 (2005:10ff). This intervention occurred 
during the debate over job creation during the run-up to the national 
elections in that year (government claimed that two million jobs had been 
created under its stewardship - the three authors claimed that the true figure 
was probably nearer 1.4 million). 
 
In the most recent episode in this saga, Burger and Yu (2006), who 
incidentally, are two of the co-authors of the van der Berg et al (2005) piece 
whose findings are contested by the present paper, challenge, in turn, the 
Casale et al findings on earnings. Burger and Yu attempt to clean up the 
surveys to reduce anomalies such as the effects of outliers, and to find a way 
to bridge the break in the series caused by the changeover from the October 
Household Survey, the last of which was conducted in 1999, to the Labour 
Force Survey, tried as a pilot in February 2000, and expanded to full size 
(30 000 households) by September 2000. 
 
The authors present their results in graphical rather than table form, but even 
with this drawback it is clear that interpretation is sensitive to end-point 
selection. Looking at their Figure 3 (p.8), if one starts with the very first 
LFS, earnings of informal economy workers appear to increase from about 
R500 per month (in 2000 prices) in February 2000 to about R900 in 
September 2005. Real earnings in September 2000, however, look as though 
they were about R800 per month. They dip (inexplicably?) to about R600 
per month in February 2001, only to climb again. This erratic behaviour 
undermines the validity of their claim that ‘the earnings of the self-employed 
have been steadily increasing’ (2006:8). Real earnings of the self-employed 
show a more substantial increase, possibly from about R1900 to about 
R2500 between September 2000 and September 2004 (2006, Figure 4, p.9). 
They, however, are unlikely to have been numbered among the poor in the 
first place, so are not of great interest to us. A similar conclusion holds for 
workers in the formal sector, where average earnings rise from about R2700 
to R2800 per month between September 2000 and September 2004 (2006, 
Figure 5:10). African workers in the formal sector see their average real 
earnings rise from about R1800 to R2000 per month between September 
2000 and September 2004 (2006, Figure 8:12). Average earnings of the 
unskilled show precious little change over the period September 2000 and 
September 2004 (2006, Figure 10:13), possibly rising from about R900 in 
2000 to R1000 in 2004. 
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There is little in all of this to encourage the belief that rising real incomes 
contributed much to the decline in the poverty headcount asserted by van der 
Berg et al to have taken place between 2000 and 2004. If employment of 
lower skilled workers fell, or was static (as the figures in Table 11 above 
suggest), there would be even less reason to believe that any part of the 
asserted headcount fall was due to income increases. In short, the case for 
poverty reduction of the magnitude they claim comes to rest on social grants. 
These, as has been argued above, are unlikely to have raised more than one-
and-a-half million people out of poverty. This is not to suggest, as has been 
emphasised above, that the poverty gap has not fallen. For most of the 
beneficiaries, the grants must have been an absolute godsend. It does the 
poor little service, however, to exaggerate the extent to which their plight 
has been relieved by government’s ambitious expansion of the social grant 
system. It is a shame that this ambition is limited to the expansion of the 
child support grants. Doing so leaves the group of people between the ages 
of 15 years and 60 or 65 (depending on whether they are male or female) 
with no social protection in the face of a truly massive unemployment 
problem. To pretend that problematic measures like the over-hyped 
Expanded Public Works Programme can fill this void adds insult to injury. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Analysis of the Labour Force Survey data for September 2001 and 
September 2004 suggests that the poverty headcount in 2004 (using a 
poverty line of R309 per capita per month)68 was probably in the region of 
18 million. The corresponding figure in 2001 would probably have been in 
the region of about 19.3 million. These results contrast strongly with those 
produced by van der Berg and his co-workers (18.5 and 15.4 million 
respectively in 2000 and 2004). My conclusions are sensitive to the 
assumptions made about income under-reporting, about migrant remittances 
and about social grants, in particular, the disability grant. Without taking any 
account of unreported investment income, the assumption that income from 
employment is under-reported by 100 per cent (i.e., actual incomes from 
employment are double reported incomes) would equate survey total 
incomes with national accounts totals in both 2001 and 2004. If, as I suspect, 
unreported investment income in the Labour Force Surveys is substantial, 
then an adjustment of 100 per cent for under-reporting of earnings would be 
excessive (the total of adjusted survey earnings plus unreported investment 
income would exceed the national accounts estimate of total income). This 
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means, of course, that a smaller correction than 100 per cent would probably 
be appropriate. Using the most generous of the grant and remittance 
assumption packages in Table 6, with an income under-reporting assumption 
of just over 75 per cent, leaves us with about 18 million people below the 
poverty line in 2004. More precise than this it is not possible to be. 
 
Without social grants, it is safe to say, conditions among the poor would 
have been dire indeed. The grants appear to have lifted about 1.7 million 
people over the poverty line in 2001. By 2004, rapid expansion in the 
number of grants made, raised that figure to about 3.2 million. Child support 
grants have relatively limited effects on poverty headcounts. This is due to 
the small size of the grant, and to the fact that many of the households into 
which they flow have no other sources of income. Among the social grants, 
the one with the greatest impact on poverty, not surprisingly, is the old age 
pension. In 2004, the approximately two million pensions raised about 1.5 
million people in 600 000 households over the poverty line. Five million 
child support grants, by contrast, look as though they lifted about 900 000 
people in 150 000 households out of poverty. 
 
Estimating the impact of the disability grant poses intractable problems. 
Since most of the recipients of disability grants are poor, it is probably 
appropriate to allocate the bulk of the money paid out in the form of 
disability grants to a reduction of the poverty gap. The impact on headcounts 
cannot, however, be estimated with any ease. This is because the costs of 
meeting the special needs of the disabled are not known with any precision. 
The numbers of people (and the households in which they are located) lifted 
out of poverty, cannot, therefore, be determined. In the present paper, two 
assumptions about the value to be allocated to reduction of headcounts are 
used. These result in approximately 400 000 or 700 000 people lifted out of 
poverty, depending on the combinations of assumptions used. Research into 
this question is urgently required. Unless the state can find ways to halt the 
growth in the numbers claiming the benefit (which, given its concern with 
‘perverse incentives’ in the social grant system, it is undoubtedly keen to do) 
it shows signs of overtaking the old age pensions in size. Understanding its 
impact is a matter of obvious importance. 
 
According to van der Berg et al, the poverty gap ratio rises slightly, from 
0.200 in 1993 to 0.205 in 2000, and then falls to 0.146 in 2004 (2005:17). 
The 2004 LFS data suggest rather that the ratio was somewhere between 
0.245 and 0.216 (depending on under-reporting error and benefit package 
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assumptions - see Table 6), possibly having fallen from about 0.28 in 2001.69 
While the increase in social grant expenditure is to be welcomed, the poverty 
gap in rand terms in 2004 was still some R35-37 billion per annum. As noted 
above, this was less than four per cent of income according to national 
accounts - a small price to pay for eradicating income poverty, if only some 
way of delivering it to the right people could be found. 
 
Among the 18 or so million people below the poverty line in 2004, only 
775 000 were employed. Located in 700 000 households containing 3.9 
million people, they demonstrate that the problem of the working poor is still 
very much with us. The other 14 million or so people below the poverty line 
live in workerless households (most containing working age people, but in 
which nobody had employment). These zero-income (from employment, 
that is) households survived on a mix of social grants and/or remittances. By 
the time these had all been allocated, there remained about 1.8 million 
people in households receiving no incomes at all. It is possible that the 
survey failed to capture income that they earned because the reference 
period in which they were required to report earnings (the previous seven 
days) is too short. 
 
The claim by van der Berg et al that the poverty headcount fell by three 
million does not receive much support from the evidence available. Poverty 
reduction can come about for three reasons: employment growth; earnings 
growth and increases in social grant income. On the employment front, it 
looks as though those at the top end of the distribution scored handsomely (a 
more than 600 000 increase in the number of workers in the R10 000 plus 
household income category over the period 2001-2004), while the numbers 
employed at lower income levels fell. Earnings growth of unskilled workers 
was unspectacular, as one would expect in a time of high and rising 
unemployment, and certainly not enough, when distributed among the 
handful of workers in poor households, to have contributed much to a 
headcount reduction. Social grants increased in number, but do not appear to 
have been sufficient to lift more than an additional 1.3 million or so out of 
poverty. On the positive side, the poverty rate almost certainly fell. In the 
absence of the improved social protection by which it was apparently 
caused, poverty would have been much worse. 
 
The fact that two of the household surveys conducted by the Statistics South 
Africa (the Labour Force Surveys and General Household Surveys) yield 
consistently higher estimates of poverty than do the AMPS figures (in the 
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hands of van der Berg and his colleagues), must be satisfactorily explained. 
Whatever view one takes of the extent of under-reporting in the LFSs and 
GHSs, the fact that both collect income and expenditure data independently 
(however crudely) does set them apart from the AMPS surveys, which 
collect income data only, and that only, as noted above, in bands or 
categories. The LFSs and GHSs make use of separate samples drawn from a 
master sample that is now allegedly in good condition. Their independence, 
one from the other, is important. Someone bent on dismissing poverty 
estimates built on Stats SA figures, must explain why respondents in the two 
unrelated surveys tell similar lies about income and expenditure. 
 
It cannot be denied, however, that the LFSs and the GHSs have problems 
that render them somewhat less than ideal instruments with which to 
measure poverty. In addition to the problem of under-reporting, there are 
several other areas that need attention. One of these is migrant remittances. 
Another is social grants. As I pointed out in Meth (2006a), the information 
collected by the LFSs on grants is not easy to interpret. There are also other 
components of income on which data are not collected by the LFSs and 
GHSs (investment income being probably the most important, but there are 
others such as maintenance payments, for example). In addition, ways have 
to be found to deal with missing incomes and with implausible zero incomes 
in the surveys. All of this means that the quality of the estimates of poverty 
that can be produced using official statistics leaves more than a little to be 
desired. The same, however, is probably true of the AMPS surveys, the 
purpose of which is not to gather information for poverty studies. In short, 
there is much work to be done, and a number of problems that have to be 
solved before any of the households surveys conducted in South Africa can 
be said to be yielding reliable poverty estimates. 
 
To end this part of the concluding section, a few observations on the virtues 
of estimating income poverty are in order. Before the van der Berg et al 
(2005) results appeared, the invariable response of the state to the claim that 
the problem of income poverty in South Africa was not being tackled with 
sufficient energy, was to attempt to deflect attention away from the claim by 
pointing to the poverty alleviating effects of what it describes as the ‘social 
wage’. Now, of course, it claims in addition, to have made a significant 
impact on income poverty as well. The present paper argues that the latter 
claim is not justified. 
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It is necessary to restore some balance to the debate about the significance of 
income poverty. For many years now, scholars working in the field have 
recognised and insisted that income poverty is but one aspect of a complex 
and multi-facetted problem, and that to focus on income poverty alone, is to 
lose sight of this complexity. The validity of this is universally 
acknowledged. There is, however, a danger that excessive repetition of this 
obvious truth can hinder the struggle against poverty. It does not follow that 
because measurements of income poverty cannot hope to capture the totality 
of the deprivation and exclusion that poverty in general entails, that income 
poverty is not important. Unless the state (or charity) can meet all of the 
material needs of the poor, some income is necessary. How much, is a 
difficult and much-debated question, but one which nevertheless, cannot be 
avoided. It is clear that the ‘social wage’ in South Africa reduces the income 
required to maintain the minimum lifestyle regarded as socially acceptable. 
What the magnitude is of this reduction, nobody has thus far, with any 
reliability, been able to say.70 Yet there is, as noted above, a marked 
tendency among politicians in South Africa, when confronted with estimates 
of income poverty that do not please them, to trumpet bald statistics of how 
many houses have been delivered, or electrical connections made, or clinics 
built, as though this somehow renders the issue of income poverty less 
urgent. This tactic should not be allowed draw attention away from the fact 
that people living below the income poverty line (after due allowance is 
made for the effect on that line of the so-called ‘social wage’) are poor.71 
Acknowledging the existence of widespread income poverty does not detract 
in any way from the importance of an analysis of the extent to which people 
may or may not be poor along any of the other axes along which poverty 
may be measured. 
 
 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
During the conducting of the research, the results of which are offered in the 
present paper, a number of topics for further research work, and for changes 
to the questionnaires that could improve the capacity of the household 
surveys to measure poverty, suggested themselves. In the case of one or two 
of these recommendations, it will not always be obvious how the 
improvements suggested fit into the present study. The short answer is that 
sometimes they do not do so directly. They turn up, when, in the course of 
examining a particular issue, a digression discloses new problems, which, if 
attended to, would enhance the quality of the surveys overall. The suggested 
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changes, both those that are directly relevant and those that are only 
peripherally so, are described below as a set of recommendations (directed 
mainly at Statistics South Africa, the producers of the LFS and GHS). 
 
As I argued in Meth (2006a), there is virtue in the use of the major 
household surveys as instruments with which to measure poverty, 
notwithstanding the antipathy towards doing so displayed in the past by 
senior Statistics South Africa personnel (see Meth, 2006, p32n). This 
reluctance is odd, given the history of the surveys. The final October 
Household Survey (OHS), conducted in 1999, was explicitly intended to 
facilitate poverty monitoring. The survey was made possible by a grant from 
the UK Department for International Development (DfID), in circumstances 
described thus on the first page of the statistical release: 
 
‘The Office of the Presidency approached DFID for funding, and DFID 
provided the required eight million rands to undertake the survey, with 
prime emphasis on poverty monitoring.’ (SR P0317, 31 July 2000, p.i) 
 
Where the pressure originated for the emphasis to be placed on poverty 
monitoring is not clear. Whatever its source, however, the emphasis was 
sensible. Lost in the subsequent flurry of Labour Force Surveys (LFSs) that 
supplanted the OHS, and never quite regained by the General Household 
Surveys (GHSs), poverty monitoring using official statistics ground to a halt. 
This is unacceptable. Between them, the LFS and GHS constitute a 
potentially excellent source of information on poverty. Both surveys must be 
reworked so that they can fulfil this potential. The social grant questions 
must be restored to the LFSs, in a form similar to that used in the GHSs. 
Their absence from the LFSs, makes it extremely difficult, if not impossible, 
to understand the dynamics of labour market search activity. The social grant 
questions in both surveys need to be sharpened so that they perform better. 
In the GHS there are far too many people reporting receipt of state old age 
pensions. This is probably because they are led by the questionnaire to 
confuse state with private pensions. 
 
For the child support grant, a significant proportion of respondents are 
reporting the care-giver as recipient of the grant.72 This can be eliminated 
through interviewer training. 
 
Disability grants pose an interesting problem. Of the million or so recipients 
of the grant detected by the 2004 GHS, over 400 000 answered ‘No’ to the 
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filter question (1.41) which asks whether anyone in the household is limited 
by disability. A simple link to question 1.50, which asks whether grants have 
been received, would overcome this problem. Apart from the many 
fraudulent claims for disability grants that may be lurking among this group 
of recipients, there are also likely to be many who receive the grant because 
they have TB or AIDS and are sensitive about disclosing the reason for 
being eligible for it. Their privacy can easily be maintained by the use of the 
option ‘Other’ when the type of disability is explored. 
 
Collection of income data in the LFS must be improved. In particular, the 
practice of gathering data on income from employment only must be 
changed. Investment income forms a significant part of total income, but 
anybody who is not classed as employed is not asked the income (salary or 
pay) questions. The surveys therefore skip, for example, over some of those 
living on income from investment. In addition, depending on the relative 
sizes of incomes earned, those who receive earn income from both 
employment and investments, have to omit information on one of the 
sources, because respondents are requested to furnish the information for 
their ‘main’ job (Question 4.15 in the September 2004 LFS and Question 2.8 
in the 2004 GHS). 
 
Some difficulty was experienced in incorporating migrant remittances into 
household income. This appears to result from the way in which migrants 
are identified in the data set. Persons in the household are identified by a 
Unique Household Identifier (UqNr) in columns 1-14, and by a number 
ranging from 1-30 in columns 15-16 in the Person data file. Migrants are 
identified by the same Unique Household Identifier (UqNr), and a migrant 
number ranging from 1-7 in column 15 of the migrant data file. Try as I 
might, I could not easily distinguish migrants from household dwellers, 
when trying to integrate migrant incomes into household income. Could this 
problem not be solved by commencing the numbering of migrants at 31? 
 
Inexplicable zero incomes in very poor households may be caused by the 
seven-day reference period in the income question. If poor people work 
sporadically, a few days here and a few days there, with long gaps between 
spells of work, the LFS could easily miss such activity. It is revealing that 
the agricultural questions in the LFS show millions of people engaging in 
subsistence production at various points in the year, while the stricter notion 
of employment in the activity captures only a few hundred thousand. Ways 
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must be found to discover how very poor people survivetheir incomes 
cannot be zero, week after week. 
 
One of the advantages of the LFS and GHS over the AMPS is that they 
collect information on both income and expenditure. Even though the latter 
is in category form (with quite wide categories as expenditure levels rise), it 
is much better than no information at all. The quality of both income and 
expenditure estimates can be improved if, while still in the field, the 
interviewer can check to see that the values given for the two variables are 
consistent. If income exceeds the upper bound of the category given for 
expenditure, the interviewer should probe to see whether the difference is 
saved. If, by contrast, income is much lower than the mean of the 
expenditure category reported, interviewers should probe this as well. 
 
It is time to call a halt to the proceedings. I do so with the call for a way to 
be found to reconcile the differences between the findings of van der Berg et 
al and my results reported here. 
 
FOOTNOTES 
 
1 My partner, Anna McCord gave up a lot of precious time (for which I am 
deeply grateful) to read the draft of this paper. The time it took me to 
make the emendations she suggested showed how diligently and critically 
she tackled the job. Needless to say, such errors as escaped our scrutiny 
are my responsibility. 
 
2 Replication of results without complete details of the way in which they 
have been obtained is sometimes very difficult indeed. 
 
3 The status of Netshitenzhe’s claims, and the validity of some of his 
‘facts’ are discussed in Meth, 2006b. 
 
4 When the Department of Social Development says that it has paid out 
4 309 772 million child support grants in the month of April 2004, it is 
stating a fact, verifiable by means of the paper trail in its wake. 
Netshitenzhe is on safe ground when he recites such numbers. As soon, 
however, as he ventures into the interpretation of what such facts might 
mean for poverty, he exchanges the security of the verifiable for 
uncertainty of the artefact - something observed in a scientific 
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investigation that is not naturally present but occurs as a result of the 
investigative procedure. (Oxford English Dictionary). 
 
5 The September 2001 LFS also serves as a primary source, while 2004 
General Household Survey (GHS) furnishes comparative data where the 
LFS is particularly weak. 
 
6 Estimates of income in the AMPS surveys are only available in category 
or band form, so the authors are obliged as well to estimate means in the 
different income categories. 
 
7 Made at a two-day seminar on poverty measures, held under the auspices 
of the National Treasury in Pretoria in June 2005. 
 
8 The LFS data for September 2004 do not contain household expenditure 
estimates. It is not possible, therefore, to impute incomes where these are 
missing. 
 
9 In addition to those discussed here, numerous other survey design 
problems are spelled out in Meth, 2006a, pp.76ff. 
 
10 The Labour Force Surveys, as their name implies, are intended to make 
the study of labour market dynamics possible. It is only the lengthy delay 
in stripping out the October Household Survey inheritance that has made 
it possible to use the LFSs (up until September 2004) to measure poverty. 
The streamlining of these surveys to make them better at performing their 
more limited role, includes such retrograde steps as removing all of the 
social grant questions (Meth, 2006a). A re-examination of the purposes 
of Statistics South Africa’s major household surveys is urgently required. 
 
11 As noted above, the AMPS income data on which van der Berg et al base 
their results, are available only in category or income band form. 
 
12 Weighted up to the full population, individuals in zero-income 
households who were employed but for whom no incomes could be 
imputed, numbered about 252 000 among 11.8 million employed, or 
about 2.1 per cent of the total. The difference between sample and 
population proportions is presumably accounted for by the relative 
weights. 
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13 In the open category (R10 000 plus) the assumed mean is R23 000 per 
month. In the bottom expenditure category (R0-400 per month), it is 
R200. This is lower than the reported mean in those households 
containing workers who provided answers to the income question. There 
were 20 individuals in the bottom expenditure category who refused to 
answer the income question, and 35 who claimed not to know income 
levels. These numbers are so small that even if the true mean is higher 
than R200 per month, it would make little difference to the poverty 
estimates. 
 
14 In the counterpart to the present paper (Meth, 2006a), I used income 
estimates to impute household expenditure levels, where the latter were 
suspect (incomes exceeded the upper bounds of expenditure categories). 
 
15 This will be tested and reported on in a future version of this paper. 
 
16 In Table 11, the figures are 13.7 and 14.9 respectively. The figures in the 
table have been adjusted to remove those who do not belong in the zero-
income category, like the 250 000 workers and the members of their 
households. 
 
17 Figures for the expanded unemployed would obviously be similar. 
 
18 In 2001 the category boundaries were R0-264 and in 2004, R0-309 per 
month. The upper bound in each case is the value, in current prices, of the 
R250 poverty line, which is given in 2000 prices. The lower bound of the 
categories in each case should be some small, positive amount rather than 
zero. 
 
19 See spreadsheet LFS 2004 – 100 percent error.xls and LFS 2001.xls, 
worksheet ‘Missing’ in each case. 
 
20 This is about nine per cent of all households, the difference being a 
consequence of the ‘fact’ that the average number of people in ‘true’ 
zero-income households is smaller than the national average. 
 
21 See the LFS metadata. For the employed, Status1=1. 
 
22 This was pointed out to me by Michael Noble, Director of the Centre for 
the Analysis of South African Social Policy (CASASP) in Oxford 
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University. They need not necessarily do so - it is conceivable, for 
example, that someone who lives on the rent generated by, say, several 
apartment blocks, could consider themselves to be ‘employed’. 
 
23 See Question 2.1 in the September 2004 LFS. 
 
24 Question 4.15 in the LFS on income, is applicable ‘to household 
members who have been performing certain economic activities in the 
seven days prior [to] the interview.’ 
 
25 Another problem is that either the 2004 GHS has 500 000 households too 
few (or the September 2004 LFS has 500 000 too many). For a 
comprehensive review of some of the changes that need to be made to 
both the GHSs and the LFSs to turn them into useful instruments for 
measuring poverty, see the concluding section in Meth (2006a). 
 
26 While writing the concluding section in Meth (2006a), I discovered, and 
was very surprised to do so, that the entire household section, and with it 
the questions on social grants, had been excised. Its restoration is strongly 
recommendedwithout such information, it is impossible to understand 
the job search activities of the poor (Meth, 2006a). 
 
27 The ability of the surveys to find the correct numbers of social grant 
recipients is a measure of their (the survey’s) quality. 
 
28 Michael Noble of CASASP points out that about 80 per cent of 
respondents in the 2004 GHS identify the child in respect of whom the 
grant is paid. The remainder identify the care-giver, pers comm., 15th 
August 2006. The question in its present format was first introduced in 
the 2003 GHS (Question 1.38). 
 
29 The GHS figure is for July, whereas the Table 4 figure, which originates 
in the departmental figures (the SocPen database) are for the month of 
April. 
 
30 Curiously, the number of care dependency grants, which the Table 4 
figures put at about 78 000 in 2004, is relatively well captured by the 
GHS (58 000). It effect on poverty, in the overall results presented in this 
paper is thus correspondingly greater than that of the much more widely 
distributed foster care grants. The foster care grant was worth at R540 per 
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month in 2004. The care dependency grant, a disability grant for a child, 
had the same value as the disability grant for adults, R740 per month. 
 
31 At least, spending in households receiving the disability grant (and other 
social grants) appears to be more responsible in focussing more on ‘good’ 
consumption (food, fuel, housing), than on ‘bad’ (like tobacco). See 
EPRI, 2004, p.3. 
 
32 A couple of studies carried out by the Community Agency for Social 
Enquiry (CASE) (Schneider et al, 1999 and Schneider and Claassens, 
1999), although somewhat dated, look as though they could be of 
interest. Unfortunately, they are marked on CASE’s website as ‘Not for 
distribution’. 
 
33 R1502 per month and R266 400 in the case of a single applicant, and 
R2782 and R532 800 for married applicants in 2004 (Simchowitz, 2004, 
pp.4-5) 
 
34 The sequential multiple regression technique can probably give a rough 
indication of what incomes (and expenditure levels), but rough is the 
operative word. 
 
35 Korinek et al (2006) point out that non-response may take the form either 
of unit non-response, where certain selected households do not 
participate, or of item non-response, where households do not answer 
certain questions. Presumably compliance functions in both cases may be 
either monotonic or U-shaped. 
 
36 Among the rural poor, where most expenditure is on food, Deaton (2003, 
p.32) argues that the ‘proxy’ respondent’s report is likely to be ‘quite 
accurate’. This, he says ‘is much less so in more diverse and better-off 
households, with some family members working outside of the home, 
and maintaining partial budgetary independence.’ 
 
37 Non-response, another possible cause of the difference between survey 
and national accounts income estimates, is most prominent in South 
Africa among households in ‘high-walled security areas and golf estates’, 
see P0210, 31 March 2005, p.ii. Such households are almost certainly 
well-off. This may bias the sample in the direction of poorer respondents, 
causing poverty to be overstated (Korinek et al, 2006, p.34). 
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38 Ravallion has also compared surveys and national accounts data as 
sources of information on economic welfare (2003). Concentrating 
mainly on private consumption expenditure (PCE), he shows that the 
concepts generated respectively from the two sources are essentially 
incomparable. Working his way through a long list of different problems 
that plague both, he comments that there can be no presumption that 
either is right, or wrong (2003:647). Similar considerations presumably 
apply to income. On the issue of the incomparability of the two measures, 
see also Havinga, Kamanou and Vu (undated). 
 
39 Ravallion addressed the question of the validity of ‘anchoring poverty 
measures in the national accounts’ on an international scale in a special 
article in The Economist (Apr 7th 2004). Written in response to an earlier 
claim in the publication that World Bank surveys were overstating 
poverty (see The Economist of 13th March 2004), Ravallion notes that the 
research cited by The Economist relies on poverty estimates anchored in 
national accounts, rather than surveys. Although when suitably adjusted, 
the two approaches point to similar trends, he warns that there is no room 
for complacency about poverty. 
 
40 For the Indian case, Ravallion offers the following explanation: ‘The 
difference,’ he says, ‘between the NAS and NSS consumption numbers 
reflects in part measurement errors in the former and the fact that the 
spending of the (apparently growing) non-profit sector cannot be 
separated from household consumption when accounting for domestic 
absorption of measured output in the NAS.’ (2000:3251) 
 
41 Most favoured among welfare indicators is private consumption 
expenditure (PCE). In working with the literature, I have treated income 
and consumption (expenditure) as though they were interchangeable. The 
weaknesses of doing so are acknowledged. It is likely, however, that 
many of the problems of under-reporting are common to the two 
concepts. In any case, since the attempt to estimate poverty in the present 
paper is undertaken as a means of testing the expenditure based poverty 
estimates in Meth (2006a), there is no alternative but to treat income 
estimates as a potentially useful source of information about poverty. 
 
42 Varying adjustments to the migrant remittance figures can be made 
within any of the specified error ranges. 
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43 This way of treating under-reporting error differs from the approach I 
used in Meth (2006a). There, what I called the ‘nominal’ under-reporting 
error applied to all of household expenditure. The percentage errors 
involved were consequently much smaller, for example, it required an 
error of only about 40 per cent to get the number of poor down from 
about 18-20 million to the van der Berg et al figure of 15.4 million 
(Meth, 2006a, p.51). In the present paper, it requires an upward 
adjustment of 200 per cent to the income figures from the September 
2004 LFS to produce the same result. 
 
44 Making ‘corrections’ of differing magnitudes presents no problems; the 
difficulty lies in knowing what the relative sizes of the corrections should 
be. 
 
45 This is apparently caused by an oddity in the way that migrants are 
numbered in the survey. The means devised to get around this may be 
seen in the STATA Do File ‘crinc.do’, which will be made available for 
inspection on request. In brief, a new variable was created for migrants 
who reported sending income home. 
 
46 Whether or not this poverty line is defensible, is not at issue here. Its 
continued use is justified only on the grounds that it facilitates the 
conversation begun by van der Berg et al. The weaknesses of a study that 
concentrates solely on income poverty are also wholeheartedly 
acknowledged. The fact that the results in the present paper are a 
response to income poverty estimates produced by van der Berg and his 
co-workers, is, however, sufficient justification for producing more of the 
same. 
 
47 Compensation of residents equals R677 billion, net operating surplus, 
R454 billion and corporate savings R35 billion. See South African 
Reserve Bank Quarterly Bulletin June 2006, pp.S-132-133. One assumes 
that the changeover to the 1993 SNA did not cause the definition of net 
operating surplus to differ too much from the old definition of ‘Income 
from property’ as ‘… dividend receipts; interest receipts less interest 
payments; rent receipt less maintance (sic) cost, mortgage interest and 
consumption of fixed capital; and profits of non-corporate business 
enterprises after consumption of fixed capital and after inventory 
valuation adjustment.’ (See South African Statistics 2001, p.19.13) 
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48 The proportion of pensions going into zero-income households (about 65 
per cent) is even larger than the proportion of child support grants (45 per 
cent) also finding their way into such households. 
 
49 When this is not done, there is an apparent diminution in the 
effectiveness of the grant system as the assumed level of under-reporting, 
and the correction applied to income from employment to compensate for 
this, rises. Both the GHS and the LFS figures return this pattern of 
results. This appears to be caused by the distributions of income that the 
surveys uncover, and the way in which they change as the value of 
income from employment increases. For (some of) those households 
containing workers, the effect of increasing the correction for assumed 
under-reporting is to lift the households above the poverty line, thereby 
reducing the amount of poverty alleviation ‘work’ that has to be done by 
social grants. 
 
50 The first LFS was conducted in February 2000, the last October 
Household Survey having been carried out in 1999. 
 
51 Where expenditure fails us, it has at least been possible to use race as a 
proxy (albeit a very crude one) to permit an educated guess to be made of 
the likelihood of particular workers being poor. 
 
52 The ‘missings’, ‘don’t knows’ and ‘refuses’ among respondents in the 
September 2001 LFS are similar in proportion and number to those in the 
September 2004 LFS. In 2001, there were 26 532 employed respondents. 
Of them, 18 920 (71.3 per cent) gave point estimates of income, while 
5997 (22.6 per cent) gave category estimates. Missings, don’t knows and 
refuses numbered 1618 (6.1 per cent of the employed). After imputation 
using data on expenditure, this was reduced to 637 cases (2.4 per cent of 
the employed). Source: own calculations using September 2001 LFS data 
set. 
 
53 In the absence of the increases in the numbers of social grants, poverty 
would obviously have been much worse in 2004. Applying the 2001 
headcount ratios to the 2004 population suggests that there would have 
been somewhere between 1.8-2.2 million more poor people in 2004 than 
are reported in Table 8. 
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54 See Statistics South Africa’s Stats in brief 2005, Table 2.5, p.11. 
 
55 In South Africa’s case, the target year is 2014, the 20th anniversary of the 
commencement of democratic rule, rather than by 2015. It is not known 
what base year the South African government has in mind. The United 
Nations uses 1995. Because of the fragmented nature of South African 
statistics, poverty levels in 1994 or 1995 are the subject of some 
disagreement. 
 
56 Recall that President Mbeki used the figures to reassure Prince N E Zulu, 
during question time in Parliament on March 30th this year, that 
government was on course to halve the poverty rate by 2015, while Joel 
Netshitenzhe uses them to make the same claim in his critique of Pilger 
(Sunday Independent, August 20 2006). 
 
57 Poverty gaps in Table 8 are larger than those in Table 6 because the 
former do not take migrant remittances into account. 
 
58 A starting point for the investigation could be with the fact that the total 
numbers of households in the two surveys differ by a larger than 
expected amount. 
 
59 In July 2000, the old age pension and the disability grant were worth 
R540 per month, and the child support grant, R100. By April 2004, these 
had risen to R740 and R170 respectively (National Treasury 2004, p.74). 
Deflating these to 2000 prices by the Consumer Price Index yields values 
of R598 and R137. Growth in the real values of these grants (10.7 and 
37.3 per cent respectively), is quite impressive. It came, however, after 
years of stagnation or falling real values. In the case of the old age 
pension, the real value fell continuously from R614 per month in July 
1995 to R555 in October 2002 (in constant 2000 prices).  
 
60 The real value of old age pensions, disability grants and care dependency 
grants fell slightly, while the real value of child support grants rose a 
little (by about 3.5 per cent). 
 
61 Social grant ‘packages’ for 2001 are constructed using different 
assumptions from those used to make up the 2004 ‘packages’. Package 
No. 1 in 2001 applies the ratios of numbers beneficiaries per household 
from the 2004 GHS to the numbers of households in 2001 that report 
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receipt of an old age pension or disability grant. Package 2 in 2001 
applies the ratios of the SocPen (the Department of Social Development’s 
administrative data base) to survey estimates of the numbers of old age 
pensions, disability grants and child support grants. Package 3 is similar 
to Package 2, except that it halves disability grants to allow for special 
needs of the disabled.  
 
62 Clearly, the distribution of that growth is one of the critical determinants 
of the extent of poverty reduction. If income growth comes off a low 
income base, the effects on the poverty headcount will be minor, even if 
growth is relatively rapid. Poverty gap ratios should fall, but the poor will 
be as numerous as ever. 
 
63 Income categories in 2004 are multiples of R309, the 2004 equivalent of 
R250 in 2000 prices. The corresponding figure for 2001 is R264. 
 
64 In 2004, for a 100 per cent under-reporting error, the estimated means in 
the income categories R3090-4999, R5000-9999, and R10 000 plus per 
month were, respectively R3936, R6885 and R27 225. Corresponding 
figures in 2001 were R3729, R6880 and R23 776. Source: own 
calculations using September 2001 and September 2004 LFSs. 
 
65 There may well be other accounts of what happened during the period. 
 
66 Statistics South Africa commented in the February 2002 LFS (SR P0210, 
25 September 2002, p.i) that longitudinal analysis of the first three rounds 
of the survey was underway. The results, to the best of my knowledge, 
have not been published. By the time the September 2002 LFS was 
published, it had been decided that ‘All the labour force survey results, at 
this stage, are based on a cross-sectional analysis, since there are 
insufficient collections over time for a longitudinal analysis.’ (SR P0210, 
25 March 2003, p.i). In March 2004, it was announced that cross-
sectional analysis was still the order of the day because ‘the matching 
process was still underway’ (SR P0210, 28 September 2004, p.i). Other 
than a reference to the fact that rotating panel surveys allow both cross-
sectional and longitudinal analysis, the ‘new look’ LFS of September 
2004 offers no hint of progress (SR P0210, 31 March 2005, p.xix). A 
similar note appears in the March 2005 LFS (SR P0210, 28 July 2005, 
p.xx), and in the September 2005 LFS (SR P0210, 24 January 2006, 
p.xxii). Incidentally, the fourth round of the LFS, conducted in 
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September 2001, saw a new sample being drawn to replace the original 
sample, the members of which were suffering respondent fatigue (SR 
P.0210, 23 September 2003, p.i). There is no reference in any of the LFSs 
to the frame from which this sample, all of whose original members 
would long since have been ‘rotated’ out (20 per cent exit with each 
round), being changed. 
 
67 A third round of the KwaZulu-Natal Income Dynamics Study (KIDS), 
has been completed. This discloses some mobility upwards out of 
poverty. It also shows some increase in incomes. The proportion of the 
sample that is chronically poor (below the poverty line in all three rounds 
of the KIDS) is roughly constant. pers comm., Julian May, August 2006. 
It is a pity that the study is restricted to the province of KwaZulu-Natal, 
which although large, diverse and populous, cannot necessarily be 
assumed to be representative of the country as whole. 
 
68 This is the equivalent, in 2004 prices, it may be recalled, of the R250 per 
month per capita used by van der Berg et al (2005). 
 
69 A poverty gap ratio for 2001 that is comparable to the 2004 ratio taking 
into account income from all sources, cannot be estimated because there 
are no estimates of migrant incomes in 2001. See Table 8 for 2001 and 
2004 poverty gap ratio estimates that can be compared. 
 
70 The latest offering in the social wage field is from Bhorat, Naidoo and 
van der Westhuizen (2006), who use factor analysis to estimate changes 
in asset poverty. For all its apparent sophistication, the approach is not 
able to say anything about the impact of increased service provision on 
incomes. A report on the social wage, commissioned by government 
(HSRC, 2004), provides some interesting insights, but does not solve the 
valuation problem satisfactorily. In a highly tentative analysis, I have also 
attempted to estimate the impact of the social wage on poverty. An early 
and extremely crude attempt was made in Meth and Dias, 2004. A 
slightly more refined version of this approach was used to derive the 
results in Meth, 2005, building on the concept of the ‘bankability’ of the 
social wage. There is, however, still a long way to go. Government’s 
attempts to value the impact of the social wage are risible. The results 
published in the Ten Year Review of the estimates of the impact of social 
spending on the Gini coefficient between 1997 and 2000 (PCAS, 2003, 
pp.90ff) have already been referred to above. 
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71 Income may be a poor proxy for consumption levels, which themselves, 
are a far-from-perfect proxy measure for welfare. Until something better 
is devised, the level of income required to enjoy the consumption deemed 
to be socially necessary to avoid slipping into poverty (below the poverty 
line), will have to suffice as a measure of income poverty. No claim is 
made here that the R250 per capita per month used by van der Berg and 
his colleagues is adequate. 
 
72 According to Michael Noble, about 20 per of respondents do this. pers. 
comm., August 2006. 
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